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I. Introduction.
This article will summarize the current progress of regional arrangements in the
Asia Pacific Region. The main question presented here is whether a regional arrangement -
whatever the level of institutionalization - is necessary for a given region, based on its politi-
cal and economic conditions. While discussed in terms of the Asia Pacific cooperatives, a use-
ful comparison may be drawn to the North American Free Trade Agreement It is hoped that
this discussion will provide a useful background in considering the specific policy recommen-
dations and the appropriate institutional context in which to understand the NAFTA.
In order to examine these questions, I will first summarize the general condi-
tions or motivations for regional arrangements. It is difficult to define dearly the ele-
ments which encourage regional arrangements. For the sake of convenience, I will juxta-
pose objective economic, political or security conditions, against policy considerations for
establishing arrangements. If certain States in a region increase their economic interde-
pendence, they are forced to coordinate their interests to avoid friction. This requires
them to establish rules regulating each member's behavior.
Instead of this spontaneous method, the nations may use coordinated efforts to
create a regional framework. Creating an economic area with a view toward obtaining
economic efficiency and promoting development is one example. In this regard, it is use-
ful to compare arrangements from the viewpoint of their basis and motivation. Most
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arrangements, including the European Community (EC) and the NAFTA have both eco-
nomic and political motivations.
There is often a correlation between increasing interdependence and the establish-
ment of regional economic arrangements. Frequently, dear efforts are made to achieve polit-
ical purposes. This includes cases in which regional economic integration is used to create
friendly relations among potentially confrontational States, and in cases where some States
form a single economic unit to enhance their international political influence.
It is difficult today to find regional arrangements which are motivated purely by
economic factors. Political motivations almost always exist, including reactions to the
development of regional arrangements in other regions and, more symbolically, to
demonstrate solidarity among certain countries. If we examine the development of the
EC, we recognize various elements which affected the nations' progress toward integra-
tion. It was natural that States with similar economic conditions chose regional coopera-
tion to achieve a more efficient allocation of resources. On the other hand, the move-
ment toward European integration has always been motivated by political considerations.
At an early stage, the basic motivation to create a common market was Franco-German
reconciliation and the creation of a stronger, more stable and more prosperous Europe
during the Cold War. The development of the EC has always been flavored with some
sense of protection of economic interests against the United States, and later against
developing Asian countries.
Several complex elements could affect policy-makers' intentions when they con-
sider what institutional framework they will establish: (1) whether it has a legal body or a
forum for consultations; (2) whether or not strong dispute settlement mechanisms are
built in; (3) the extent to which members' domestic policy is regulated by such an institu-
tion; and (4) by what mechanism they set up rules among member-States. Other condi-
tions, such as cultural linkages among member-States and their relative economic condi-
tions may indirectly influence the setting up of regional institutions.
On the basis of these considerations, this article will focus upon the Asia Pacific
region. It can again be emphasized that before APEC, despite increasing economic inter-
dependence in the region, there had been no successful attempt at creating regional
arrangements. Examples of early unsuccessful attempts are the initiative for a Pacific Free
Trade Area (PAFTA) in the 1960s, and an Organisation for Pacific Trade and
Development (OPTAD) in 1968. Although it has achieved some political significance, the
history of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been less than opti-
mal from the perspective of trade and investment.
After these sporadic developments, the first successful framework for regional
cooperation was the establishment of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC)
in 1980, an informal forum consisting of individual representatives of members. Some
reasons for such modest early achievement may be summarized as follows. First, coun-
tries in this region are economically and culturally diverse. This could discourage
attempts to establish an institutional framework in this region, even though economic
interdependence has grown stronger. Second, developing countries have adopted a mar-
ket-oriented strategy, creating exports with outside countries in an effort to promote
competition. This may be incompatible with an authoritative institutional arrangement,
which could serve as a protectionist body, negatively affecting free market mechanisms
both inside and outside the region. Third, several political elements are present. For
example, ideological confrontations such as that between Communist China and the cap-
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italist Chinas (Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other Chinese traders in South East Asia) and
between Indochina and the island nations may have been a major obstade.
During the Cold War, a security framework based upon bilateral security arrange-
ments with the United States diminished the need for a regional institutional arrangement.
In some cases, security arrangements have developed along with economic integration, such
as NATO/EC and the OAS and Latin American economic arrangements. Though it is diffi-
cult to quantify the interaction between security and economic factors, there certainly has
been some mutual influence, whether occurring spontaneously or by design.
Full-fledged efforts toward regional cooperation began with the establishment of
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in November 1989, based upon
Australia's proposal in the previous year. The background for this new dimension might
be summarized as follows. First, increasing economic interdependence has encouraged
mutual dialogue and cooperation. Trade once had a "vertical" aspect, consisting of
industrialized countries and natural resource suppliers. This arrangement formed a "hub
and spoke structure" with industrialized countries such as the United States and Japan at
the center of vertically linked trade networks. Such arrangements differed significantly
from less diversified regions such as the original EC and EFTA. Mutual interdependence
is required in any arrangement, with equal participation among the affected countries.
Otherwise, the characteristics of arrangements will differ, like development-oriented or
assistant-oriented arrangements exemplified by the Lom6 Convention. The present
APEC members maintain certain vertical aspects, corresponding to the diversity of their
stages of development. However, the increasing mutuality will enable members to estab-
lish an EC-like comprehensive arrangement.
Second, successful economic development of some medium and smaller
economies has given those members the confidence to participate in a regional frame-
work, thus allowing them to avoid domination by major economic and political powers.
It is no accident that some developing States are the most provocative members in the
discussion on the future of the APEC process. The reallocation of economic power with-
in the region is a principal motivating factor for regional cooperation.
Third, with regard to security, the diminishing Cold War tensions have provided
an indirect momentum for progress. Unlike Europe, the end of the Cold War is much less
apparent in Asia, where ideological confrontations remain. However, the collapse of the
Soviet Union has changed the strategic environment. More importantly, the introduction
of economic pragmatism by socialist countries such as Mainland China and Vietnam cre-
ates a background for practical economic cooperation among ideologically different, but
economically integrated countries.
In addition to these underlying conditions, it can be also pointed out that the
APEC process is more policy-based. One result is that APEC is becoming a symbol of
cooperation in the region, developing relations between East and Southeast Asia and
North America. The alternative to this direction might be a separate development of a
mutually exclusive NAFTA and EAEC (East Asia Economic Caucus) processes. Therefore,
APEC is an increasingly important link between these potentially divisible regions.
Against this background, APEC can be a unique model of regional arrange-
ments. It reflects the economic, cultural, and political diversity among its members, but
has a prevailing universal aspect. Therefore, the future plan for APEC requires the same
considerations needed for universal international organizations such as the WTO and the
IMF. Expanding upon this point, APEC has the following features. First, its internal
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cooperation is based on economic pragmatism, rather than cultural and psychological
ties among its members. Second, it can fundamentally be an "open" arrangement to out-
side; APEC need not become an economically defensive organization. Third, APEC could
become a more expansive arrangement so long as it maintains its current institutional
flexibility. Fourth, APEC will continue to develop as an amalgam of subregional, multi-
dimensional organizations such as NAFTA, the Australia-New Zealand Free Trade
Arrangement, and an expected AFTA by ASEAN members.
APEC's present direction was set in the third ministerial meeting in Seoul in 1991
by adopting the Seoul APEC Declaration. This Declaration set forth the following objec-
tives: (1) regional growth and the achievement of common interests for the region's inhabi-
tants; (2) the strengthening a multilateral free trade framework in a global sense; and (3) the
internal liberalization of trade and investment compatible with GATT principles.
With these objectives in mind, the Declaration stipulated two methods of coop-
eration. First, the organization is committed to the respect of mutual interests, consider-
ing its members' different stages of economic development and different social and politi-
cal systems. Second, APEC seeks to promote open dialogue and consensus by respecting
all members' views.
Therefore, APEC dearly recognizes diversity among its members, including their
different stages of economic development and different domestic social and political sys-
tems. There is an intention to maintain the nations' economic development, based upon
the free trade principle. In this context, free trade has two implications. One is the pro-
motion of internal liberalization of trade and investment, and the other is the mainte-
nance of free trade with outside economies. This second aspect can be achieved by main-
taining the compatibility of the GATT-WTO principles, based upon the most-favored
nation principle.
However, it is not totally dear how APEC will achieve GATT-WTO compatibility
in the process of further development; regional arrangements always portend a potential-
ly negative effect on the GATT-WTO framework. It is also unclear how APEC members'
style of economic development can be integrated in the GATT-WTO framework. The
post-war period has seen a process of constant discussion as to how underdeveloped
countries can achieve economic development, and the GATT regime has been affected by
this consideration. APEC members include several of the world's most rapidly growing
economies, and how regional arrangements cope with these successful economies is an
important issue. If East Asian countries have different patterns or styles of economic
development, and if these patterns are useful to others, it will be worth considering how
to incorporate them into the legal framework of an expected regional arrangement, and
ultimately into the GATT.
Based upon these points, this article will first discuss the general basis for
regional integration in order to judge whether the Asia Pacific region requires integration
and, if so, what form of arrangement would be most effective. Second, I will examine the
historical facts of various attempts at regional arrangements. Finally, focusing on the
APEC process, I will summarize several issues, examining their implication for other
regional trade compacts such as the NAFTA. Such issues include (1) membership scope
and qualifications; (2) the nature of the institutional arrangement, whether flexible or rel-
atively rigid; and (3) the program for cooperation, such as internal liberalization, harmo-
nization, and the form of dispute settlement mechanism, if necessary.
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II. General Conditions for Economic Integration in the Asia Pacific Region.
A. ASIA AND THE PACIFIC AS A REGION.
1. Defining the Asia-Pacific Region.
In considering inter-State cooperation in the Asia Pacific area, it is difficult to
define the scope of the region. This issue has cast a shadow over arguments over member-
ship eligibility in various planned arrangements proposed in recent times. Debates range
from which countries should be induded, to whether membership should depend upon a
given level of economic development or a given type of economic system. 2 These argu-
ments sometimes confuse geographical and functional definitions. Moreover, most projects
have defined no dear policy as to geographical or functional determinants. Sometimes, an
organization has pursued a certain policy in order to eliminate an undesired country 3 For
instance, some policy-makers argue Russian should be excluded because it has not achieved
a sufficient economic level or fully implemented a market economy.
Geographically, there is an argument that countries (or broadly, regions) facing
the Pacific Ocean should be included in any Asia-Pacific compact. 4 This definition will
certainly tend to limit more goal-oriented criteria. However, such an objective selection
may cause other debates. For instance, Argentina and Brazil will claim that they should
not be excluded while Chile is included.
Functionally, it is sometimes argued that a certain level of economic develop-
ment is necessary.5 This may be reasonable if a planned arrangement presupposes an
advanced level of economic conditions to attain reasonable goals such as liberalization
and harmonization. Required conditions could include a level of development, the
prevalence of market mechanism, or a given level of liberalization. Similar requirements
are set for membership in the OECD and the IME6 On the other hand, if an expected
arrangement is aimed at promoting cooperation between countries at diversified stages,
stricter rules will cause difficulties in achieving such a purpose, and the arrangement will
be seen as discriminatory agains less developed countries in the region.7
Adding to these difficulties is the relative novelty of an Asia Pacific compact
More precisely, the concept has not been clearly established, and is thus still evolving.
The emergence of the Asia Pacific region has required increasing economic and political
interdependence among potential members. This linkage must be enhanced by trans-
portation, telecommunications, and personal exchanges.8 In this regard, it is difficult to
observe a similar level of regional interchanges in the Asia Pacific region as have taken
2. Robert A. Manning & Paula Stern, The Myth of the Pacific Community, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Nov.-Dec. 1994, 79, at 80-81; see Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, POWER AND
INTERDEPENDENCE (1989).
3. See Karl W. Deutsch, THE ANALYSIS OF INTERNAIONAL RELATIONS (3rd ed. 1988).
4. Keohane & Nye, supra note 1.
5. Ernst B. Haas, BEYOND NATION STATE (1964); see James A. Baker, 111, America in Asia:
Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community, FOREIGN ArFAiRS, Winter 1991-1992, at 1.
6. See Baker, supra note 5, at 14.
7. Haas, supra note 5.
8. Id.
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place in Europe and North America. Moreover, sub-regional units still exist. For instance,
relations among ASEAN members can be clearly distinguished from relations between
ASEAN and Northern Pacific Rim nations. 9 U.S.-Japan relations have shown similar dis-
tinctions. Thus, geographical definitions are quite different from functional definitions.
2. Some Features of the Asia Pacific Region.
a. The existence of sub-regions.
As discussed above, the Asia Pacific Region is a relatively new geographical con-
cept. For this reason, the area continues to be identified with several diverse sub-regions,
which have both a geographical and a functional unitary character. 10 These are East Asia
(or, Northeast Asia, including China, Korea, Japan), Southeast Asia (which covers both
Oceania and the Laotian and Malay Peninsulas), North America, Latin America and the
South Pacific (Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea). 1 I With the economic
development of Southeast Asian countries, there arises the concept of East Asia in a broader
sense. The East Asia Economic Caucus initiative by Prime Minster Mahathir of Malaysia is
an example. 12 However, "Asia-Pacific" is sometimes used in a narrower sense to include
only the Asian Pacific Coast In order to include the Americas, the term "Pacific Rim" is fre-
quently used. Whether Latin American countries are induded in the Asia Pacific Region is
still debatable, though geographically they are induded in Pacific Rim.
More functional sub-regional divisions are also used. The naming of "newly
industrial economies" (NIES) may be a typical example. 13 ASEAN has become another
name for the second generation of NIES.
b. Characteristics of the Asia Pacific Region in a stricter
sense.
The emergence of the concept of "Asia Pacific" in a broader sense (including
North America and South Pacific) corresponds to the emergence of economic dynamism
in "Asia Pacific" in a stricter sense. 14 First Asian NIES emerged, followed by ASEAN.
More recently, the Chinese mainland, Indochina, and some Latin American countries
have emerged as participants in the Asia Pacific realm. Asia Pacific formerly existed only
as"points and lines;' among industrialized countries. 15 The industrialization of NIES has
been significant in identifying Asia Pacific as a region in a two-dimensional sense. 16 The
future development of this concept also will depend on further development of NIES,
9. See Deutsch, supra note 3.
10. Hadi Soesastro, IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POST COLD WAR POLITICAL SEcuRITY ENVIRONMENT FOR
THE PACIFIC ECONOMY, 365 (1991).
11. Id.
12. See Kim Anderson, Is an Asia Pacific Trade Bloc Nexrt?, 1994 JTWL 27 (1994).
13. Chia Siow Ue and Lee Tso Yuan, SUBREGIONAL ECONOMIC ZONES, A NEw MOTIVE FORCE IN ASIA
PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT, 225 (1994).
14. Anderson, supra note 12.
15. See Haas, supra note 5.
16. Mark Borthwick, Issues in Pacific Basin Regionalism, in Hadi Soesastro and Han Sung-joo
(eds.) PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, THE NEXT PHASE, 70 (1983).
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although significant difficulties also lie within that concept.
Several general characteristics are germane to development of inter-State coop-
eratives. First, most countries in this region have either directly or indirectly been sub-
jected to Western.imperialism until sometime after the Second World War.17 Some coun-
tries, mainly in Southeast Asia, were under colonial rule. 18 Others, including China, were
under strong - if less overt - pressure from Western powers, having been forced to
offer lease territories and ports, and to conclude unfavorable commercial treaties. 19
As is true in other former colonized areas in the world, the region still suffers colo-
nial legacies. For instance, arbitrarily drawn borders inherited from colonial times tend to
ignore ethnic or cultural units in the region.20 This problem results in potential, or some-
times actual, ethnic, cultural, or religious domestic conflicts, creating potential political
instability. For the same reason, potential territorial disputes still exist in some areas. 21
Second, the region abounds with historical political disputes, which have con-
tributed to existing political instability.22 Some conflicts derive from above-mentioned
colonial legacies and the resultant domestic instability. One example is the confronta-
tions between Malaysia and Indonesia, which lasted for a significant period after their
independence. Moreover, several legacies remain from the Second World War itself, such
as the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan. Cold War confrontations also persist
in some areas, such as the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. 23
The once infamous North-South antagonism still occasionally manifests itself in
the form of anti-Western (or anti-industrialization) campaigns. Since the end of the
Second World War, the region has experienced all-out war in Korea and Indochina, as
well as lower-level military conflicts, such as those between China and the Soviet Union,
and Malaysia and Indonesia.
Third, there is a perception that most countries maintain an autocratic or
authoritarian system, and are therefore anti-democratic. 24 This is certainly an exaggera-
tion, probably stemming from the fact that Communist regimes still exist in the region. 25
Some claim, for instance, that Asian Communism is fundamentally rooted in traditional
Asian sentiments. On the other hand, it is also true that some countries have resorted to
military force to put down domestic minorities or defiant groups, as with the Tiananmen
Square incident in 1989. This aspect creates further political instability and intensifies
problems in relations with outsiders - thus, again, causing repercussions to regional
instabilities.26
17. H. Edward English, The Emerging Pacific Community, in Hadi Soesastro and Han Sung-Joo
(eds.) PACIFIC EcoNoMic COOPERATION, THE NEXT PHASE, 91 (1983).
18. Id
19. Id.
20. Soesastro, supra note 10.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Soesastro, supra note 10.
24. Michael S. Dobbs-Higginson, AsIA-PACIFIC, ITS ROLE IN THE NEW WORLD DISORDER (1994).
25. Id.
26. Keohane, supra note 2.
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B. GENERAL MOTIVATIONS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION.
This and the following section will discuss the process of regional cooperation in
more general terms. This will allow us to examine later whether the Asia Pacific Region
really needs a regional arrangement. Such arrangements require that economic interde-
pendence, cultural identities and geographical proximity be taken into account. 27 It is
also true that regional arrangements often are motivated by other than purely economic
aspects. For example, governments also may desire to create a peaceful relationship
among member-States, promote political influence, and stabilize common interests
against external pressures.2 8
1. Economic Interdependence and Regional Arrangements.
A debatable question in the economic aspect of regional arrangements is
whether the creation of regional arrangements is a logical consequence of active econom-
ic transactions among relevant countries. When a group of countries have enhanced
their economic interdependence, the immediate result is an increased exchange of
advanced technology (such as telecommunications and transport), which in turn gives
rise to increased commerce in products, money, information, and personal contact.29
Naturally, this gives rise to common issues which require improved responsiveness of
political authorities.30
Economic interdependence is promoted primarily by activities of multinational
enterprises, which require governments to provide more appropriate conditions for their
activities. 3 1 For instance, governments must work to eliminate governmental barriers to
entry, improve investment laws, and harmonize technical standards.32 On the other hand,
economic interdependence increases the need for more effective regulatory measures to
cope with a more integrated regional economy.3 3 Market failures can result from monopo-
listic or oligopolistic behavior by multinational enterprises, which have harmful effects
upon the efficient functioning of a developing market mechanism. 34 As regional liberaliza-
tion progresses, distribution problems also may become a policy consideration, leading in
turn to a politically unacceptable allocation of economic benefits. 3 5 These circumstances
will necessitate policy coordination to satisfy the demand from private economic entities.36
27. Id
28. Deutsch, supra note 3.
29. Keohane, supra note 2; see Baker, supra note 5.




33. Id An example is the U.S. response to Mexico's peso crisis.
34. Deutsch, supra note 3.
35. Id
36. Haas, supra note 5.
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It is also likely that governments recognize the necessity for policy coordination
to maintain effective domestic economic policies. In the current world, fiscal policies of
one government will immediately influence transnational money flow and commercial
activities, thus reducing the effectiveness of domestic policies. The need for policy coor-
dination will be further recognized as cooperation develops.
These are mainly passive methods of coping with economic conditions.
Governments also may engage in policy coordination to achieve some regional policy
goals.37 An example is a creation of improved infrastructure for economic development.
Such infrastructure includes physical conditions, such as the creation of transport and
telecommunication networks at a regional level, as well as technical conditions, such as
legal frameworks, taxation agreements, investment protection agreements, and navigation
arrangements. The creation of a regionally-based dispute settlement mechanism may
include such examples, which facilitate region-wide commercial activities.
It is debatable whether a more rigid permanent arrangement will be more effective
than ad hoc policy coordination. The issue is whether institutionalized collective manage-
ment may be better than ad hoc arrangements. In some areas, collective frameworks can
work effectively to achieve goals, induding trade liberalization at a multilateral level such as
GATT. Collective liberalization may be more acceptable to domestic pressure groups, by
persuading them that the nation should pursue a common international theme.
Mexico's liberalization policy in the framework of the NAFTA is a primary exam-
ple. Mexican citizens regard the NAFTA as an extraterritorial disciplinary system; however,
this is probably more acceptable to a domestic audience than if the same restrictions were
implemented as a domestic policy. Furthermore, there is some question whether it is neces-
sary to create rigid institutions with permanent bodies and regular meetings, thus subject-
ing signatories to a certain level of binding (legally or politically) decisions.
If it were feasible, a relatively rigid framework would would more effectively pro-
mote the policy goals mentioned above. It would resist protectionist or nationalist pres-
sures by engaging in internal liberalization or in harmonization at a regional level. An
institutional framework also would provide a useful basis for economic factors by
enhancing predictability - and, thus stability - by which economic activities would be
gauged. When such a framework dealt comprehensively with the overall aspects of eco-
nomic life, an arrangement for allocating benefits could be achieved, thus enhancing the
division of labor among member-States.
Of course, this model reflects an ideal situation. In reality, there is a constant diffi-
culty in establishing an effective inter-State arrangement, as most regional arrangements
have experienced. Economic interdependence will require policy coordination. However, if
cooperation were encouraged, an effective institutional arrangement could be implemented.
2. The Political Aspect of Regional Cooperation.
The examination of general motives is based upon an example of economic
principle in an ideal form. In addition, economically irrational political elements and
strategic security needs should be considered in examining regionalist movements.
37. Deutsch, supra note 3.
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a. Improvement of Security Conditions.
What is frequently observed in practice is the creation of a regional economic
framework to enhance relations among otherwise antagonistic partners. Intensified com-
mercial transactions and personal exchanges will improve the underlying international
relations, thus avoiding heightened political tensions. A well-known and successful
example is the economic integration between Germany and France following the Second
World War. Because the nations are now economically indispensable to one another, the
likelihood of another European war is greatly diminished. Economic arrangements have
facilitated political integration, thus improving stability in the region.
b. External Political Influence.
Economic arrangements also are used to strengthen member-States' political
power towards outsiders. In a sense, this type of arrangement is similar to a military
alliance. The collective power projection by the EC has mystified outsiders through its
ability to reach and sustain complicated institutional arrangements. The creation of the
European Commission, while maintaining governments of member-States, has made it
difficult for outsiders to specify a proper target for negotiations, thus giving bargaining
advantages to member-States.
Similarly, ASEAN members have begun to realize that collective policy-making is
more influential toward outsiders. In this regard, small countries gain an advantage in most
cases, since their position may be backed by a group of similarly situated nations. However,
members also may be forced to adhere to the positions of stronger member-States.
c. Nationalistic Motivation.
In the examples above, there are cases in which regional arrangements are used to
fulfil nationalistic desire by demonstrating unity and projecting collective power. Some
regional groups of developing countries in earlier era had such a motivation. The
Organization for African Unity was such a collective. The Arab League and the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries include similar elements. This type of arrangement may
divert pressure from outsiders which member-States regard as a serious threat.
d. Counter-action Against Other Regional
Arrangements.
More recently, it has become popular to create arrangements to retaliate against
unfavorable actions by other multinational groups. The progress of European integration
has been a constant motivation for similar attempts in competing regions, motivated by the
fear of exclusion from a European trade bloc. This was probably true in the inception of
EFTA. Recent movements like the NAFTA and APEC also have seen an anti-EC aspect. This
obviously creates a danger of pre-war type economic confrontations among trade blocs.
e. Containment and Inclusion.
There are two goals which support inclusion of stronger nations in blocs of
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weaker partners. First, regional arrangements have been aimed at containing unfavorable
actions by one powerful member of an arrangement. Second, arrangements also are used
to maintain strong commitment by one country, which other members regard as neces-
sary for the benefit of the region. An example of the first type of arrangement is that
NATO and the EC each provide a framework which Germany must obey. From
Germany's viewpoint, such arrangements provide it with trust or credibility from other
member-States, thus giving it an agreeable position in Europe. An example of the latter is
the United States in APEC. Some countries in the Asian and South Pacific side of APEC
expect a continuous U.S. presence in the region, based primarily upon their security and
economic needs. The framework of APEC with the U.S. as a main member is thus a man-
ifestation of the U.S. commitment to the western Pacific rim. APEC also has a negative
containment aspect in its treatment of China. Smaller neighboring countries may wish to
contain this giant country in a predictable and advantageous framework.
C. SOME GENERAL ISSUES CONCERNING THE PROCESS OF REGIONAL
INTEGRATION. 38
In considering the creation of regional arrangements, it is also necessary to
examine the actual process of creation.39 This includes issues like the speed of the forma-
tion, areas given priority for integration, and stages of progressive depence.
1. Dichotomy Between Political and Economic Aspects.
In some analyses of the integration process, such as the neo-functionist
approach, it is argued that regional arrangements can be created smoothly if they begin
with economic integration to enhance the general atmosphere for integration. This is
particularly true during this stage of development, since cooperative feelings among poli-
cy-makers lead to a more complete political integration. Therefore, functional or "sec-
toral" integration in limited areas will be a good start for a steady integration process.
The best established model of this process is European integration, which started
in limited areas such the regional management of coal and steel products. 40 This model
was then expanded to more general trade matters, and is finally evolving into political
areas.4 1 It is correct to say that regional integration should start in less sensitive areas,
which are more acceptable for member-States, to avoid unnecessary confrontations. This
argument is based upon the dichotomy between political and economic areas; the
dichotomy was dearer when associated with military and non-military aspects.
However, particularly after the end of the Cold War, the distinction of political'
matters has become more ambiguous. This characteristic is stronger in Asian countries,
whether sovereignty or nationalism is still sensitively considered. Thus, most economic
issues tend to be recognized in a political context. As will be discussed later, the APEC
process has a clear determination to concentrate upon economic fields; nonetheless, it
invited some difficulties for the same reason.
38. Karl W Deutsch, THE ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 3rd ed. 1988.
39. Deutsch, supra note 3, at 181.
40. Haas, supra note 5, at 451.
41. I4
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2. "Gore Groups" for Integration.
In the process of integration, the functioning of core groups, "unifiers" or "bal-
ancers," is sometimes discussed. These terms refer to certain member-States which work
to boost overall integration.42 For instance, the post-war European integration has been
encouraged by strong relations between Germany and France. These factors have had a
complementary relation to each other.
D. CONDITIONS FOR REGIONAL ITEGRATION IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION.
In examining the current circumstances in Asia pacific, one can easily point to
favorable elements for creating a regional arrangement. However, difficulties remain in
creating a cooperative on the same level as Europe. The region is characterized by the
progress of economic development and interdependence, but political instability contin-
ues to be a serious impediment.
I. Economic Interdependence.
The region has enhanced internal interdependence by increasing trade and
investment among constituents. This interdependence has been encouraged by the devel-
opment and sophistication of newly industrialized economies. 43 It is also striking that
countries which maintain a communist regime are becoming players by increasing their
economic ties with other industrialized and industrialising countries on a market-orient-
ed economic approach. Economic transactions among the three Chinas (Mainland
China, Hong Kong, Taiwan) are particularly significant in creating another economic
sphere in the region.44
ASEAN members also are deepening the overall economic relations among
themselves.45 Indochina countries are entering a similar path to development. Such eco-
nomic development, particularly on the Asian side, has changed the trade structure of
regional economy. Alignments which were formerly traditional vertical relations have
become more horizontal, and therefore more equal. This fact has contributed to reduc-
ing north-south confrontations by strengthening north-north cooperative relations, like
the EC and EFTA.
Formerly, the region had a hub and spoke type economic relationship, with the
economic cores being Japan and the United States.46 This feature is also changing into
more regional mutual trade and investment, thus actively increasing trade and investment
by NIES to other countries in the region. One feature of enhancing economic interde-
pendence in the region is its outward-lookingness. Most advanced countries, such as the
U.S. and Japan, have traditional economic relations with other areas this phenomenon is
42. Manning & Stern, supra note 2, at 81.
43. 1&.
44. Norman D. Palmer, THE NEw REGIONALISM IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, 175 (1991).
45. 1&. See also Gavin Boyd (ed.), REGIONALISM AND GLOBAL SECURITY, 234 (1984).
46. Manning & Stem, supra note 2, at 88.
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intensifying, along with deepening economic relations with other countries in the
region. 47NIES also are increasing trade and industries with outsiders, based upon their
export-oriented economic strategy.48 This feature certainly makes it difficult to create an
exclusive regional arrangement. However, the question remains, what type of arrangement
is most appropriate for the region? This is another fundamental issue in the APEC process.
2. Geographic Proximity.
Regional arrangements, by definition, have a certain regional basis. This aspect
is, in some cases, related to the above-mentioned economic interdependence, since geo-
graphic proximity leads to an increase in economic transactions among States. It may
also cause a cultural-psychological closeness, and sometimes bring about common politi-
cal and security concerns. Therefore, in most cases, proximity is not itself an automatic
source of integrative motivation, but elements deriving from it should be counted as rele-
vant factors for regionally-based cooperation or integration.
In a diplomatic world, countries geographically close to each other inevitably
make some dealings and set out arrangements such as border arrangements, commercial
transactions, and immigration, based upon demands from the relevant audience.
However, it is also true that proximity and the potential for cooperative relations can
result in antagonism. Therefore, States may ally themselves with more remote but like-
minded partners, rather than direct neighbours. This phenomenon has existed since the
beginning of diplomacy, and still exists in the current world. An American military and
political presence in relatively small Asian countries during the Cold War had such impli-
cations in terms of those nations' relations with their direct neighbors, such as the Soviet
Union and People's Republic of China.
In the current era, it is also true that geography is not the only source of proximity.
Technological advances have created proximity among remote countries through improve-
ments in transport and telecommunications. Cultural factors and ideology may also ignore
geography, creating dose groups of States despite geographical remoteness. Therefore, the
significance of geographical proximity is relatively decreasing in the current world.
From the beginning, the Asia Pacific Region has had difficulties defining itself as
a single geographic unit, even with the improvements in transportation and telecommu-
nications mentioned above. One physical feature of the region is that it forms a'rim'-like
shape, surrounding the Pacific Ocean. This may cause another difficulty in making them
dose to each other. Geographical elements are sometimes considered for allocation of
institutions and physical arrangements. Most EEC institutions were located in Brussels,
which sits between Germany and France; Washington DC was geographically at the cen-
ter of the thirteen original States of America.49
47. Id.
48. Palmer, supra note 44.
49. But see Manning & Stern, supra note 2, at 81. For a discussion of how a lack of shared values
throughout the Pacific Rim may curtail economic cooperaion beyond Asia.
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In this regard, it is difficult to find a geographically suitable place for the head-
quarters, if any, of a future Asia-Pacific institutional arrangement. Perhaps Hawaii is one
possibility, though its relevance in Asia Pacific dynamism may be limited. The existence
of two areas of geographic significance, namely North America and East Asia, may make
such an arrangement more difficult
Against this background, it is inevitable that Asia Pacific, however dose it may
become as a region, preserves sub-regional groupings among themselves. These sub-
regional groups will correspond to traditional geographic proximity, as well as in an eco-
nomic, political and cultural sense. Such a direction will make the building of a regional
arrangement more complicated, and this is currently happening. A parallel development
of sub-regional arrangements, such as NAFTA and ASEAN, may be an inevitable result of
the geographical background of Asia Pacific.
3. Cultural Identity.
Cultural factors are also regarded as a significant element in a regional arrange-
ments. Common cultural backgrounds and shared values are one reason for successful
arrangements, as in the case of the EC. 50 Cultural aspects are sometimes used to create a
psychological exclusiveness or solidarity among member-States. However, cultural
aspects also may create a defensive and aggressive posture toward external relations.
In this respect, the Asia Pacific Region may be one of the most culturally vague
regions in the world. There is a clear division by historical background. For example,
many East Asian countries formerly were dominated by Chinese or Indian culture, with a
religious background of Buddhism and Confucianism. Other areas, such as North
America and the South Pacific, have experienced a much stronger Western influence. 51
Therefore, even though Western culture has spread to Asian countries, it cannot be
denied that they have a different cultural and historical background. This presents several
difficulties in using cultural elements for a'glue' for regional arrangements. 52
However, it is also true that Asia Pacific nations have begun to realize their com-
mon elements, such as economic pragmatism. To a large extent, these countries are moti-
vated by their desire for economic development. This aspect is one reason for the current
progress of regional cooperation in Asia Pacific. From this fact, we may also deduce that
regional arrangements may be based upon pragmatic, neutral cooperation, with the rela-
tive importance attached to extra-economic aspects, such as culture and history.
4. Political Motivations.
As discussed above, most regional arrangements tend to have political aspects,
such as the desire to promote or limit political influence. The collapse of the Soviet
Union and the corresponding loosening of tensions may reduce the need for a strong
regional arrangement to cope with external threats, as in the EC during the Cold War. On
50. Palmer, supra note 44.
51. I
52. Id. But see Manning & Stern, supra note 2.
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the other hand, it is becoming more important to deal with potential intra-regional conflicts.
Therefore, a regional arrangement may be used to create a basis for improved
security within the region. This is one motivation for the post-war economic integration
between France and Germany. However, the condition in Asia Pacific is not a one-to-one
confrontation; therefore, more intense confidence-building will be required to improve
the security condition. Strategically, the inclusion of China in an arrangement may be
significant to preserve a dialogue with this powerful economic force. While Chinese
inclusion may be the most significant achievements in any Asia Pacific accord, this has
not yet happened in the APEC process. In a strategic sense, maintaining a U.S. commit-
ment to East Asia has become an important consideration to any Asia Pacific accord. For
the U.S., therefore, participation in an Asia Pacific arrangement will evidence its loyalty to
the East Asia region.
On trade matters, intra-regional aspects are more dominant than external con-
siderations. The reaction to the EC integration and increasing fear towards its protec-
tionist tendencies is one aspect of a regional arrangement in the Asia Pacific region.
Beyond this, it is difficult to see that the region is seeking one voice in trade negotiations.
Originally, it is difficult to form a single position on other than a general principle. The
region includes almost the entire spectrum of economic players, including advanced
industrialized counties, newly industrialized countries, developing countries, agrarian
countries, and natural resource suppliers. Therefore, the significance of a regional
arrangement in this region may be more internal. For instance, it may be more feasible to
include sub-regional free trade areas in a regional framework, preventing such areas from
becoming exclusive zones. Regional supervision (whether institutionalized or not) may
be effective for such a purpose. Regional pressure on some countries to encourage certain
economic policies, including liberalization and coordination with others, may be useful
in arriving at such an arrangement.
E. DOES ASIA PACIFIC NEED A REGIONAL ARRANGEMENT?
To summarize the discussion on motivations for an Asia Pacific regional
arrangement, there are both advantages and significant obstacles to such a regional
arrangement. On the positive side, several elements are common to similar attempts in
other regions. The increasing economic interdependence and consequential common
goals necessitate inter-State cooperation in the region. It is generally prudent to deal with
certain types of problems at a regional level, if those problems are regionally rooted.
Intensified economic transactions will require policy coordination, common infrastruc-
tures and dispute settlement in the region.
It may be doubtful, however, whether the creation of a separate arrangement in
Asia Pacific for tackling such issues is really necessary. As examined above, the diversity
of constituents in the Asia Pacific region is nearly complete. In order to deal with com-
mon issues in the region, existing multilateral frameworks and, if necessary, ad hoc bilat-
eral treatment, are already available. It is difficult to find compelling reasons for creating
an additional mechanism specifically for the region. Rather, there is a danger that a
regional arrangement might weaken existing multilateral frameworks such as the WTO
by its redundancy and complexity.
It may be that a regional arrangement will be complementary to the multilateral
approach, thus filing gaps which multilateral frameworks will leave unsettled and fortify-
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ing rules set out by multilateral arrangements. However, the Asia Pacific region contains
almost the entire spectrum of multilateral regimes. Therefore, there will be little room
for a regional arrangement to complement multilateral frameworks.
In the political aspect, it is difficult to find an urgent need for a regional arrange-
ment in the region, unlike West Europe during the Cold War period. There may be two
positive reasons as exceptions. One benefit is the creation of an arrangement to counter
the protectionist tendency of'the EC and similar organizations. Whether this will be nec-
essary depends upon the future direction of the EC and the effectiveness of the WTO
regime. The other is maintaining the U.S. commitment to East Asia, which some coun-
tries desired for political or economic reasons.
A regional arrangement will at least maintain dialogues and consultations between
the U.S. and East Asian countries, and will force the U.S. to consider regional issues. Neither
of these factors is motivated by an economic rationale. A regional arrangement in the Asia
Pacific region is naturally a policy choice, and is not merely based upon an economic view-
point. Policy-makers should consider possible costs and benefits as a result of the creation.
Economically speaking, benefits may be less than costs for the reasons discussed above.
Those who are in favor of such an arrangement should prove its utility in areas such as tech-
nical cooperation and infrastructure building, while showing that the arrangement can be
established without weakening the multilateral cooperation.
Finally, obstacles to the creation of a regional arrangement in the region may be
summarized as follows. First, the economic and social diversity among the constituents
will become the single most significant obstacle to such an attempt.53 In addition to
diversified sizes and strengths, different policy goals among countries are also a contro-
versial issue. The U.S. is presently attempting to to maximize economic benefits from
other countries, particularly in East Asia.
On the other hand, countries like Malaysia prefer a more Asian-based nationalis-
tic arrangement, and thus are motivated by the political implications. The consequential
problem is lack of leadership needed to create such an arrangement. External security
conditions cannot become a unifier for the region, because countries have different secu-
rity concerns, depending upon their geographical position and circumstances. This is a
basic difference from the post-war Western Europe, which had a unifying core group
(France and Germany), and external pressures for integration (strategically, the Soviet
Union, and later, economically the U.S.).
II. Pre-APEC Development of Regional Cooperation.
A. GENERAL TRENDS.
It is generally believed that the Asia Pacific region has been the least active area
in the world for regional cooperation, especially before the inauguration of APEC. This
presumption normally has been made in comparison with other regions in a more
advanced stage of cooperation, such as post-war Europe, Latin America, Africa, and
more recently, North America. However, as will be discussed, APEC is not a revolution-
53. Manning & Stern, supra note 2, at 8 1.
53. Manning & Stern, supra 
note 2, at 81.
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ary step toward cooperation. Rather, it is a continuation of long-standing trends toward
regional cooperatives.
It is true that there have been restrictive conditions for cooperation at the
regional level so far, together with general negative elements which are summarized in the
previous section. There are several negative conditions for the pre-APEC period. First, in
the immediate post-war preiod, which featured the colonial structure and subsequent
decolonization in Asia, newly independent nations were reluctant to seek inter-State
cooperatives. In most cases, the new States were more in favour of nation-State building,
of greater political and economic independence.
These States tended to be politically and economically separate, much as under
the former colonial groupings. This was particularly notable in Southeast Asia, which
had consisted of colonies of different western powers. For this reason, it was difficult to
create a regional consciousness or identity. Therefore, from the economic development
standpoint, a strategy of self-sufficiency was in the forefront; this was not a motivator
toward nation-building in the economic field. At a regional level, the only possible moti-
vation was an anti-imperialist perspective. This type of divisive feeling in the region was
later added to by the dominance of the Cold War element, and therefore the attempt at a
regional arrangement was again prolonged.
Second, most States in the region were dependent upon external powers, with
separate interests. As mentioned in the previous section, the enhancement of regional
economic interdependence may become a motivation toward cooperation, thus leading
to regional arrangements. Few States were active trading countries; moreover, their eco-
nomic ties were primarily for natural resources and manufacturing products. 54 The lack
of regional economic interdependence originated from this colonial dependence, and was
a main obstacle to regional cooperation.
Third, the newly independent developing countries were reluctant to create a
cooperative relationship with more industrialized States in the region. The economic
dependence upon regional economic powers has increased, but at the same time, psycho-
logical resistance and mistrust prevails. This fact also affected the cooperative atmos-
phere, and became a focus in dealing with issues like membership, mechanisms and
resource allocations. It has long been believed that ASEAN countries opposed the estab-
lishment of an overall regional arrangement. Some nations, such as Malaysia and
Indonesia, are still reluctant Additionally, the tendency has existed among less developed
States to consider other regional economic powers to be mere aid-donors; this has been
another obstacle to an equal-footed regional arrangement.
One dilemna which existed in less developed States is the resistance to domina-
tion by regional and externally developed countries, while retaining the inevitable depen-
dence upon such powers in economic, political and military terms. This element repeat-
edly has influenced the creation of regional cooperative attempts, with lasting effects
upon subsequent negotiations. For instance, a functional arrangement like the Asian
54. This has often been referred to as vertical economic integration.
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Development Bank has a clear mandate to balance regional and non-regional States by
allocating voting rights between the two groups. In any sense, the linkage with outsiders
is always natural and necessary.
It can be suggested, therefore, that excessive sensitivity to involvement of exter-
nal powers should be replaced by a more generous attitude. There is a tendency to evalu-
ate regional arrangements using criteria which focus on internal factors, rather than
external factors such as participation of external countries. Consequently, the UN
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), which includes
purely external States such as the U.K., France, the Netherlands, is sometimes underval-
ued in comparison with arrangements like APEC, which excluded a European element. It
is difficult to find a justification for such an approach.
On the basis of these viewpoints, the following section will examine the evolun-
tionary progress of Asia Pacific regional cooperation. First, some sporadic initiatives pre-
ceding the Second World War will be summarized. Second, I will discuss the post-War
trend, including regional-based attempts, sub-regional examples, like ASEAN, and trade-
oriented cooperative attempts, which have finally led to APEC.
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATION.
1. The pre- World War II Era.
Prior to the Second World War, when most of the Asia Pacific region was covered
by Western colonies (either nominally or de facto), and before there was a dearly crystallized
notion of an Asia Pacific region, it was natural that attempts at regional cooperation were
imaginary or ideological Attempts at cooperation were sporadic, and were basically unoffi-
cial private attempts. It is difficult to see a direct link between such attempts and most post-
war initiatives for cooperation, which have developed under radically different condtions.
a. Early attempts to create an Asian concept.
Virtually all propagation of' "sia" in the pre-war era was based upon an ideolog-
ical background, with political propaganda taking an anti-Western or anti-colonial direc-
tion. It is no coincidence that such movements occurred in early modernized States, such
as India and Japan. In India, the demonstration of an Asian theme lay in the context of
its independence movement. This movement was based upon nationalism, and was
directed almost exclusively against Western colonial domination. It is unclear whether
India's independence movement included notions of regional cooperation. However,
most movements in other countries during this era had a simiar motivation and basis.
Of course, the majority of anti-colonial initiatives were exclusively domestic
movements against imperialist States, rather than attempts to form an all-Asian front.
This was clear in the anti-Western struggle in China in the late 19th and early 20th cen-
turies, exemplified by the Taiping Rebellion and the Boxer Rebellion.
In Japan, which achieved early modernization and industrialization, the Asian-
oriented political ideology was sporadically fermented by ideologues, mostly in reaction
to the rapid westernization strategy of its government. These movements were associated
with radical nationalistic activities, and therefore doubts remain as to whether such
movements were capable of creating an arrangement with substance.
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b. The Institute of Pacific Relations.
One of the early unofficial attempts, worth mentioning for its Asian Pacific wide
scope, is the activity of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR). The IPR was a purely non-
governmental body which organized all-Asian-Pacific conferences. These conferences,
held mainly by academics, began with meetings in Honolulu from 30 June to 15 July
1925. The basic motivation was to promote the basic relations between Pacific peoples
"to avoid misunderstanding and conflicts and to promote friendship and cooperation. 55
The original proposal was for a pan-Pacific YMCA conference, but later developed into a
more general conference among Pacific rim countries including the United States,
Australia, Japan, and China as well as several smaller States.
The Institute finally disbanded as a result of a U.S. Sentate investigation. 56 What
was notable about the IPR is its uniqueness in membership, which included States having
a Pacific coast. This reflects a concern about deeply-rooted problems across the Ocean,
which eventually contributed to the Pacific Theater of World War II.
In their first conference in 1925, a primary agenda item was immigration, which
was a principal source of antagonism among attendees, and which became an indirect
cause of the subsequent war. Succeeding conferences frequently dealt with other issues
like the Chinese situation and economic conditions in the Asia Pacific region. These
issues also related to tensions arising across the Pacific Ocean in the immediate pre-war
period. The role of the IPR has been replaced by other attempts at cooperation after the
war, which are more practical and action-oriented. The IPR was, however, valuable as an
early attempt to create consciousness as Pacific States, and therefore as a bridge to subse-
quent attempts at cooperation.
c. Japan's initiative: the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere.
Another unique attempt in the pre-war era was the idea of the Great East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere, by which Japan justified its military expansion into other Asian
and Pacific countries, including China, Southweat Asia, and then Oceania. Its basic
points were the creation of an Asian sphere, totally independent of Western domination
and intervention, by linking natural resources in its peripheral areas to Japan, as a center
of industrialization.
Although this idea reflected the anti-Western, nationalistic ideology of modem
Japan, it generally is considered that the initiative was propaganda and the pretext of
aggression, both toward and outside its members. Scholars recently have noted that
Japan's initiatives in Asian or Pacific cooperation are viewed with suspicion by other
Asian countries, particularly in Southeast Asia.57 Those nations have generally opposed
Japanese domination, even if only econoically. This may be explained in part by the
memory of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which covertly attempted to subor-
'55. Institute of Pacific Relations, 82 Cong., 2nd Sess (Internal Security SubCommitee).
56. Id
57. Manning & Stern, supra note 2.
90 NAFTM law and Business Review of the Americas
dinate other Asian countries to Japan. 58 Some commentators insist that APEC is so suc-
cessful since it was originally proposed by Australia, and first agreed to by South Korea,
and not by Japan.59
2. Some Features of the post- World War II Progress.
Following the Second World War, there was an evolution through various
regional cooperative initiatives. First, the overall trend toward regional cooperation was
relatively inactive. In part, this was due to relatively low economic performance in many
developing countries. This factor also preserved the economic dependence of less devel-
oped countries upon developed countries. Thus, there developed a hub-and-spoke
arrangement between external powers and developing countries.
Second, the Cold War had a unique influence upon this region. This phenome-
non brought about confrontational conditions, which occasionally led to military conflict
(e.g. the Korean War, the Vietnam War), and more frequently, to political antagonism
(e.g.. in Southeast Asia between the two Chinas). The Cold War division also intensified
political diversity in Asia, thus making cooperation at the regional level more difficult.
Even today, reminiscences of the Cold War work as an obstruction to regional move-
ments. This being the case, most countries have become pragmatic enough to concen-
trate upon economic development. Now, the three Chinas (the People's Republic of
China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) have all become members of APEC. Vietnam joined
ASEAN in July 1995. On the other hand, sensitive elements remain, manifested by the
People's Republic of Chinas resistance to full participation of Taiwan in APEC and other
economic conferences.
Third, and most importantly, almost all successful regional cooperation attempts
prior to APEC have been private schemes (though almost all maintain some governmental
link, in terms of its budget source or participants. As is going to be summarized below,
major completed frameworks, like the Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAF-
TAD), the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), and the Pacific Economic Cooperation
council (PECC), are all private, unofficial, non-governmental organizations, but, at the same
time, all have some relations with governments at different levels respectively. Such an unof-
ficial character of regional arrangements before APEC was simply the result of the reluctance
on the side of relevant governments to create an official governmental organization.
However, the preservation of a private character had some advantages, resulting
in successful, effective cooperation: Current economic dynamism is based upon market-
oriented economic development, led by the active performance of the private sector,
induding multinational enterprises. Therefore, it is natural and effective for economic
cooperation at the regional level be headed by cooperation amongst private entities.
Given such a condition, a private initiative may be more appropriate for the natural cre-
ation of regional identity, without any element of forceful imposition by governments. A
spontaneous cooperative mood in the private sector will lead to a steadier development of
58. See IMPERIAL STATEMENT OF THE DECLARATION OF WAR, Dec. 2, 1941, Kashima Peace Institute
(ed.), 1 NIHON GAiKo SHUYOH BUNSHo, NENPYOH (MAIN DocuMENTs AND EVENTS OF JAPAN's
DIPLOMACY) 3.
59. See generaUy, APEC A BriefHistory, JAPAN ECONOMIC INsTIT= OF AMERICA, 39. Oct. 20,1995).
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regional arrangements. At the same time, a private, unofficial effort may have sufficient
flexibility with practicality, which can correspond to difficulties and volatility in actual
circumstances. A strong governmental structure might also be too rigid for constructive
cooperation. Finally, in actual cases, the private approach can avoid political sensitivity
which governmental organizations cannot. With regard to the handling of membership
issues, too, the elimination of the governmental element, at least pretentiously, may facili-
tate it by circumventing political implications. Sensitive political issues include, for
instance, struggles by plural entities for the recognition as the legitimate government or
representative, ideological confrontations at an official level, and, sometimes, territorial
disputes between States. On the basis of these elements, the preponderance of the private
sector in the post-war cooperation has become its uniqueness, distinguished rather rea-
sonably from other more governmentally-oriented regional arrangements.
Fourthly, as is always the case in regional schemes in Asia Pacific, virtually all
pre-APEC arrangements have been based upon an outward-looking perspective. This
focus has sometimes influenced membership, structures, and policy-making.
3. Major Inter-governmental Regional Attempts in the Post-war
Period.
The following section will summarize the characteristics of some initiatives by
reference to the above-mentioned trends.
a. Initiatives for General Cooperation.
Early initiatives were not necessarily limited to trade and investment issues,
except for the Asian Development Bank (ADB), or more subregional initiatives, such as
ASEAN and SEATO.
The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
(ESCAP) 6° started as the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
(ECAFE) in 1947, and adopted its present name in 1974. It is a regional commission
under the UN Economic and Social Council; therefore it always has had the character of
being the regional outlet of the UN in Asia Pacific. This aspect is unique to ESCAP. From
its beginning, ESCAP has presented a question as to whether the body should be purely
regionally-based or maintain its affiliation as a UN branch. It is symbolic that the mem-
bers at its inauguration consisted of four Asian and six non-Asian countries. The early
era of ECAFE influenced the decolonization process, and there was a debate as to the
scope it would cover. Also, the covered area became rather broad, ranging from Islamic
States like Afghanistan to Pacific Island countries.
To make matters more difficult, ECAFE lacked the resources for its first mission,
post-war reconstruction. The subordination to the UN has been one reason why ESCAP
has not been highly valued as a regional body. Some point out its insufficiency in the
context of regional cooperation, along with its excessively wide scope, including research
and planning, information collection, infrastructure-building, population policy, trade
60. David Wightman, Toward Economic Cooperation in Asia, THE UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC
COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE FAR EAST, (1963).
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and investment, agriculture, transportation, and economic policy coordination. 6 1
However, it is doubtful whether a purely regional arrangement was possible, particularly
in the immediate post-war period, when Asian countries were political and economically
feeble. ESCAP's broad scope is also derived from its attempt to deal with problems in a
broader context, including social aspects. It is true that later trade-oriented arrangements
may be more effective in cooperation, mainly because of their limited mandate.
Currently, the issue of external intervention has been resolved to some extent by
the Lahore Agreement, which required non-regional members to refrain from opposing
proposals which concern only a limited region. However, the problem remains as long as
ESCAP is controlled by the Headquarters in terms of its budget and tasks. It is also
pointed out that the problem lies in ESCAP's lack of authority to make use of resources
for economic development at a proper level. This reflects the West's early opposition to
giving Ecafe any authority beyond information collection and publishing. With all these
limitations, however, the general perspective which ESCAP has maintained can be still
evaluated, and its role as a provider of information as infrastructure has not been termi-
nated. As long as other recent trade organizations concentrate on trade and investment
issues, ESCAP's unique role will continue to exist.
Another unique organization is the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which is a
functional inter-governmental body with an exceptionally organized structure. The Bank
was established in 1966, under the auspices of ECAFE for the purpose of fostering eco-
nomic growth and cooperation in the Asian Pacific region. Its activities consist of, inter
alia, promoting investment of public and private capital for development purposes, and
financing infrastructure building such as water supply, sanitation, urban development,
and education. Before the creation of APEC, the ADB was sometimes regarded as the
only inter-governmental organization with a rigid institution.
The ADB is similar to other institutions in that the external element exists
inevitably, because countries outside the region are included as suppliers of funds. The
ADB's historical role has been to balance its function as a bank with that of an effective
intergovernmental body. The inclusion of the U.S. and Japan as principal donors reflects
the desire to include both regional and non-regional economic powers, thus avoiding
dominance by either power.
Care is also taken to ensure that one nation's capital share does not become dis-
proportionate, by setting out the rule to the effect that "no such increase in the subscrip-
tion of any member is authorized which would reduce the percentage of capital stock
held by regional members below 60 per cent of the total subscribed capital stock of the
bank" 62 However, from a purely economic point of view, the effectiveness of such a
quota-like arrangement is doubtful, particularly given the need for external funds. So the
quota is basically political; this factor poses a number of difficulties for the bank.
Another balance the bank must strike is between its objective function as a bank
and the necessity that it meet specific needs in the Asian Pacific region. In its early peri-
od, the Director of the Bank frequently affirmed that the ADB's policy is the sound bank-
ing principle.6 3 However, it is doubtful whether the Bank could cease to pay attention to
61. See generally, Human Resources Development Tops ESCAP Meeting Agenda, AsiAN ECONOMIC
NEws, May 1, 1995.
62. Asian Development Bank, Dec. 4 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1418, T.I.A.S. No. 6103.
63. 1& at art. 5 § 3.
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the real need for infrastructure, which may not always be profitable from a strictly eco-
nomic point view. As a regional development bank, the Bank should also pay special
attention to small, vulnerable industries, avoiding a propensity to support only big busi-
ness. However, it is also true that, as a functional organization, the Bank has a mandate to
function as a proper bank, thus it must attract subscriptions from fund-suppliers within
and outside the region.
Finally, the ADB also must maintain its uniqueness as a bank with multilateral
organization. Funding can be from governmental assistance and private investment on a
bilateral basis, but there should be advantages in the coordination and planning by adopt-
ing a multilateral framework like the ADB. This is a serious issue, since it is directly relat-
ed to the Bank's raison d'etre.
In recent years, the Bank has more readily allocated special funds, which are con-
tributed from member countries on concessional terms to less developed countries. It
now administers the Asian Development Fund, the Technical Assistance Funds, and the
Japan Special Funds. Special funds tend to reflect the preference of their subscribers, like
the favorable treatment of Southeast Asia, following the preference contributing mem-
bers. This aspect relates to the Bank's appropriate function, whether it should be based
upon regional considerations or purely motivated by economic principles.
Another rather limited functional scheme, with a less rigid structure, is the
Colombo Plan, which was established in 1950. The Plan was established, at first, as a
cooperative scheme for Commonwealth members, but now covers a wider spectrum of
nations, including the U.S. and Japan. It principal aims are to foster economic develop-
ment by facilitating donation from fund-rich countries. 64 Its operation is more bilateral,
though there exists a council for multilateral deliberations. The Plan's attempts to broad-
en its assistance projects can be seen in its establishment of the Colombo Plan Staff
College for technical education in Singapore in 1975.
Participation of non-regional members in the Plan makes more evident the
necessity that cooperatives include an external element for effective regional cooperative
schemes. During its early period, this was an advantage of the Colombo Plan for devel-
opment assistance.
SEATO was an inter-governmental, sub-regional security scheme, with similarities
to other regional institutions in terms of its link with non-regional powers and its difficulties
in coping with diversity. SEATO was established in 1954 under the South-East Collective
Treaty (the Manila Treaty), as a part of the anti-communist security network formed by the
U.S. The organization disbanded in 1977. SEATO's dissolution generally is considered to
represent a failure. However, from the beginning, SEATO was fraught with difficulties which
are both common to other Asian-based schemes and unique from them.
A notable feature of SEATO is that its members consisted of two Asian coun-
tries, namely the Philippines and Thailand, 65 and 6 non-Asian powers, namely the U.S.,
the U.K., France, 66 Australia and New Zealand. Therefore, SEATO had the notable char-
acteristic of intervention from external powers. It is also symbolic that one regional
power, Indonesia, opposed SEATO from its inception until its dissolution.
64. Id.
65. An original member, Pakistan, later withdrew.
66. France later withdrew from the military aspects of the organization.
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SEATO was a collective defense body, but both its mechanism and its operation
were insufficiently modest. The Manila Treaty was ambivalent as a collective defense
body; this reflected the U.S. misunderstanding of regional defense needs. Specifically,
"the aggression by means of armed attack in the Treaty area against any of the parties or
any of parties with unanimous agreement,"67 as provided in the Treaty, "applie[d] only to
communist aggression, and other forms of aggression or armed attack would merely
require the U.S. to consult immediately with the allies." 68 This formula was weaker than
other more typical bodies, such as NATO, in which any attack on one member would be
automatically considered as an attack on all others, thus requiring automatic action by
members.69
SEATO's viability was further undermined by the U.S. policy to maintain bilateral
security agreements with other Asian States, such as Taiwan, Japan, and Korea, to fortify its
anti-Communist front. This may have been more favorable from the U.S. point of view, to
correspond to the different needs and background of respective Asian States, and their
respective diversity. The U.S. attitude was seen as subordinating its responsibilities as a
SEATO member. For example, the 1962 joint statement by the U.S. Secretary of State and
Thailand's Foreign Minister indicated that in the event of a communist attack on Thailand,
the U.S. would lead its full support, without any prior agreement or consultation with other
SEATO members.70 This lack of collectivity in SEATO probably culminated in the U.S.
intervention in Vietnam. From such a practice, it is doubtful whether SEATO was a collec-
tive military body in substance, let alone a regionally-based cooperative scheme.
Going back to the uniqueness of SEATO's context, it is worth considering the
following points. First, reflecting the concern with the domestic instability of less devel-
oped Asian countries, SEATO had to deal with the counter-insurgency problem. This
might be a complimentary part of a collective defense scheme in a normal sense, the main
target of which may be an external attack. Moreover, military force has been used against
domestic anti-government movements when such movements were motivated by a cer-
tain ideological basis. This raises a controversial issue concerning most of the regional
collective security frameworks.
One reason for this is the tendency to incur, or at least justify, the intervention of
a dominant power in a scheme. This is particularly the case when local less developed,
politically unstable members are included in the scheme. In such cases, there are wider
gaps between dominant and dependent members, making it still more likely for a major
power to intervene in domestic political struggles. SEATO was no exception to this ten-
dency, and mechanisms like a military consultative and intelligence structure and military
advisers' representative committees are some of the most elaborate components of
SEATO. Such aspects remind us that SEATO was derived from the Cold War.
Second, with some relation to the first point, reflecting the need for economic
development, SEATO included some elements of development programs, along with its
purely security concerns. This was shown by its 1973 commitment to a greater emphasis
upon the support of development programs. SEATO intended to initiate economic pro-
67. See generally, DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS: OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952-1954, VOLUME





jects such as agricultural research and skilled labor training for its Asian members. It was
also engaged in medical research in Pakistan and Thailand. However, it is doubtful that
such projects had a significant outcome because of the benefits afforded by other eco-
nomic bodies such as ECAFE, the ADB and the Colombo Plan. SEATO was dissolved
without showing any substantial achievement in this economic area.
4. Association of Southeast Asia-Nations (ASEAN)71.
Among the various regional arrangements in Asia Pacific, both inter-govern-
mental and non-governmental, the most highly-valued body may be ASEAN, which con-
sists of relatively free, democratic Southeast Asian countries. ASEAN was founded by the
Bangkok Declaration, 72 and is a subregional, relatively inter-governmental organization.
Interestingly enough, ASEAN's reputation has improved consistently, probably exceeding
its real effectiveness. However, its recent practice shows some general signs of success.
ASEAN should neither be over-estimated nor under-estimated. However, its current rep-
utation has generally been exaggerated.
The background for ASEAN's positive reputation may be summarized as fol-
lows. First, ASEAN's coordination and cooperation have been extraordinary; successful
rigid organizational arrangements in Southeast Asia are relatively rare. One opinion
holds that the level of institutionalization indicates the sophistication of an organization's
arrangements.7 3 Under this theory, ASEAN's hierarchical structure, with the Summit,
ministerial meetings, and various committees appears relatively advanced. This aspect is
particularly highlighted by reference to the fact that all ASEAN members are developing
countries. ASEAN members' economic successes tend to be regarded as ASEAN's success
itself, and ASEAN's relative success can be counted as a successful form of regional coop-
eration between less developed countries.
Moreover, ASEAN's membership is purely Asian, with no external member
States. This purism is also considered to be positive, in contrast to other bodies, such as
ESCAP, SEATO, and the Colombo Plan, where a main contribution is made by economic
and political powers outside the region.
Additionally, ASEAN's success in the political field has created a positive image
as a cooperative body, even though ASEAN's achievement in the economic area has been
less successful. ASEAN has gained a certain level of political clout by speaking with one
71. Wolfang Moellers and Rohana Mahmood, eds, ASEAN, Future Economic and Political
Cooperation, Proceedings of the Conference on ASEAN Future Economic and Political
Cooperation, Kuala Lumpur, November 123-15 1992, Institute of Strategic and International
Studies, Malaysia, 1993, Alison Broinowski, ASEAN into the 1990s, 1990. Oordin Sopiee,
Chew Lay See and Lim Siang Kin, eds, ASEAN at the Crossroads, Obstacles, Options, and
Opportunities in Economic Co-Operation, East Asia Analytical Unit, Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, Malaysia, ASEAN Free Trade Area, Trading Bloc or Building Block?, 1994,
Handbook of International Organizations, op cit, Association of Southeast Asia Nation,
ASEAN.
72. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Bankok Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967,1025 U.N.T.S.
312, 1233 (hereinafter Bankok Declaration).
73. Sompong Sucharitkal, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 5 LLM 1063 (1996).
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voice on controversial issues - notably the Cambodian conflict, Indochina refugee issues
and, more recently, the Spratly Island dispute. These successes, though limited, may be an
overestimation of ASEAN by some commentators.
ASEAN was established in 1967, with the signature of the Bangkok Declaration
by five foreign ministers from Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and
Indonesia. The main objectives set out in the declaration was first, "to accelerate the eco-
nomic growth, social progress and cultural development; 74 and second, "to promote
active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the eco-
nomic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields."75 Therefore,
ASEAN's aim basically has been economic cooperation to attain development, while pro-
moting cooperation in various other fields. ASEAN's creation was not necessarily logical,
if one considers the circumstances of the five original countries, each of which was widely
diverse, and all of which were linked to external powers, mainly through former colonial
channels. It is doubtful whether a clear identity as ASEAN - or Southeast Asia, for that
matter - existed at the beginning. One may imagine, therefore, that ASEAN was a cre-
ation of the Cold War, supported by the U.S. strategy for a political and economic forma-
tion at the regional level. Consequently, it is not surprising that ASEAN had only limited
success during its early era.
An attempt to avert ASEAN's early stagnation followed in the wake of the end of
the Vietnam War in 1975. It is unclear how such conditions influenced cooperation
among ASEAN members, but one can imagine that security concerns, as well as a need to
promote domestic stability, led to the enhancement of economic and political coopera-
tion against the communist camp. Thus, the first heads of government's meeting were
held at at Bali in 1976, where they signed the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the
Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia.76 The organization also established
a secretariat in Jakarta.
In the following year, the members signed the ASEAN preferential trading
arrangements for trade liberalization. 77 ASEAN's achievements were first seen, however,
in the members' political cooperation during the unstable period following the Vietnam
War. In the wake of Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978, ASEAN members suc-
cessfully articulated a common position against the Vietnamese-backed government in
Cambodia, as well as opposing this conduct in international arenas, including the UN. Its
strong pressure finally led to the withdrawal of Vietnam, and subsequently promoted the
resolution of the Cambodia conflict.
ASEAN's success as a political group in this process created an image of a rela-
tively well-organized body.78 Internally, the Cambodia issue and other common regional
problems may have encouraged a sense of cooperation among the members. This coop-
eration led to attempts to resolve problems in other fields, such as economic cooperation.
This progress may be seen as an example of political cooperation encouraging policy inte-
gration in the economic sphere.
74. Bankok Declaration, supra note 72.
75. Id
76. Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Feb 24, 1976, (on file with ASEAN Secretariat); Bankok
Declaration, supra note 72, at Annex I. Treaty of Amity & Cooperation.
77. Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA), Feb. 24, 1977, (on file with
ASEAN Secretariat).
78. ASEAN Document Series 1967-1988 (on File with ASEAN Secretariat).
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ASEAN's cooperation on political matters is seen in the internal consultation in
their head-of-the-government level or ministerial meetings, where common issues are
discussed and joint positions are created. ASEAN has been fortunate from the viewpoint
of internal cooperation, in that its issues have not been of a divisive or pressing nature.
Instead, the organization has been able to articulate a joint policy in response to the
Indochina conflict and the consequent refugee problem. Through this process, ASEAN
has become recognized as a political group, even though the members' real solidarity may
be doubtful, considering the diversity in culture and domestic politics.
Another element supports ASEAN's political significance in the broader regional
context. ASEAN's relatively high institutionalization and strategic importance have given
the organization a role in Asia Pacific political consultation, though it is still at any
embryonic stage. From 1984 onward, ASEAN foreign ministers collectively have consul-
tated with foreign ministers from ASEAN's partners on various political and economic
issues. This is the so-called ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, and the dialogue part-
ners are Australia, Canada, the EC, Japan, Korea, New Zealand and the U.S. In 1993, this
dimension was further enhanced by the establishment of the annual meeting of the
ASEAN Regional Forum, which is more clearly designated as a forum for discussing
regional security issues, again at the occasion of the Post-Ministerial Conference.
Therefore, ASEAN is developing this aspect as, at least, a facilitator or regional political
cooperation recently. ASEAN's activation in the political area is also motivated by the
economic performance of each member-country, and has brought about another source
of its positive reputation.
ASEAN has been highlighted by its political successes and its economic coopera-
tion. Difficulties it has experienced are common to other economic cooperatives in the
Asia Pacific region. These include diversity in its developmental stages and economic
structure, which has hindered smooth economic and political cooperation.
ASEAN's makeup is as diverse as the States in Asia Pacific. It includes a highly
developed, geographically small country (Singapore), newly industrialized countries
(Malaysia and Thailand), countries with a less developed economy (Indonesia), an
OPEC-style, resource-dominated State (Brunei), and recently, a Socialist country
(Vietnam). This variety will increase with the expected participation of other Indochina
countries, which have basically agricultural, less industrialized, economies.
In addition, ASEAN's traditional link with external economic powers may
become an obstruction to regional cooperation. However, this aspect is proof of
ASEAN's outward-looking stance, which has contributed to its recent economic success.
It is reported that ASEAN members have begun to intensify their economic ties with
newly industrialized Northeast Asian economies, and that ASEAN members themselves
are becoming active investors in less developed Asian countries. Therefore, it is doubtful
that ASEAN really needs rigid internal economic arrangements, which characteristically
have an inward-looking character. Instead, ASEAN's economic cooperation could
become a successful model for developing countries' mutual cooperation.
ASEAN's plan for regional trade liberalization started at the same time as the
beginning of its active political cooperation. In 1977, ASEAN foreign ministers conclud-
ed their preferential trade agreement (PTA), which was the first attempt to achieve trade
liberalization among members.79 The agreement grants preferential tariff rates among
79. Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA), supra note 77.
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members.8 0 However, this arrangement did not satisfy the requirements prescribed in
the GATT for a legitimate form of regional arrangements. 81
Furthermore, the agreement is insufficient as a regional trade liberalization
scheme. Its scope was limited by its origin requirement, whereby products must contain
at least 50 per cent ASEAN materials to qualify for the preferential treatment. 82 This rule
indicates that the arrangement was motivated by a regional import-substitution develop-
ment strategy, rather than industrialization based on open trade and investment. In addi-
tion, members tried to minimize the application of the scheme by excluding certain pro-
tected products, while granting preferential treatment to non-traded products.83 Thus,
with such a limited scope, there is some doubt whether an effective plan for preferential
treatment has been implemented.
The possibility of overcoming this stagnation is now enhanced by the agree-
ments in 1992 to establish an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), consisting of the agree-
ment on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT). The AFTA plan is notably
more ambitious and stronger than before, and the background for this new direction can
be summarized as follows. First, unlike the preceding preferential agreement, the eco-
nomic performance of ASEAN members has greatly improved with the relative enhance-
ment of economic interdependence. The effective free trade arrangements generally
require a certain level of intra-group trade and members' proper economic activities.
Therefore, current conditions are much more conducive to a regional trade arrangement.
Second, with the progress of economic development, ASEAN countries have
begun to shift to a more liberal, export-oriented approach to trade. In their previous pro-
ject, ASEAN's trade policy was based on import-substituting economic development, which
in turn was based upon an inward-looking protectionist perspective at both the regional
and individual levels. AFTA has retained some protectionist elements. However, its overall
stance is more liberal, aiming at further enhancement of trade and foreign investment, both
of which have been bases for its previous economic development successes.
Third, ASEAN's recent practice of mutual cooperation and its relative success
have also contributed to a further cooperative trend, which is enhanced by the successful
formation of a political pressure group in its external dimension. ASEAN's recent cre-
ation of local economic zones across more than one country, and the success of those
measures, also have provided another motivating force for economic cooperation at the
inter-governmental level. A successful example of such economic zones is centered at
Singapore. This cooperative includes Southern Malaysia (Johor) and Eastern Sumatra.
Fourth, external aspects also are significant, as is common in most regional
arrangements. The recent trend of forming or strengthening regional trade arrangements
have been an important motivation to ASEAN members. The proliferation of regional free
trade arrangements, such as the European integrated market and the North American Free
Trade Agreement, may have influenced ASEAN, possibly posing a competitive threat.
80. ICL
81. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1125.
82. Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA), supra note 77.
83. Id.
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One can see these conditions for ASEAN as virtually parallel for Asia Pacific in
general, including the APEC process. This may be another reason why ASEAN's trade
plan is considered a model for APEC's parallel attempts, both in terms of prospects and
difficulties.
The core of AFTA is its plan for intra-trade liberalization through the use of
preferential tariffs. The liberalization plan is multi-layered and thus flexible, reflecting
the reality of the members' diverse economic stages of economic development. The
agreement forecasts that over the 15 years beginning January 1, 1993, intra-regional tar-
riffs will be reduced to 0.5 percent, and non-tariff barriers on most manufactured prod-
ucts will be eliminated. Among them, 15 product groups will be on a fast track, in which
the tariff reduction should be achieved within in 10 years. However, this mechanism
excludes sensitive products including unprocessed agricultural goods and services.
Moreover, at the discretion of each member, restricted products for the protection of
national security, health and cultural tradition will be protected indefinitely.8 4 The
implementation of this scheme remains to be seen. Further difficulties also may arise
during operations, considering economic conditions and the trade policy of some mem-
bers. One should continue to observe the interaction between the AFTA scheme on the
one hand, and the regional trade liberalization plan under APEC on the other.
One point which should be added about AFTA is its parallel character to APEC,
both of which deal with the conditions of economic diversity and the need for export-
oriented economic development. In a way, therefore, the AFTA project could become a
model for APEC plans, to be drawn up subsequently. There are several reasons for this
possibility. First, AFTAs trade liberalization scheme is a multi-layered, progressive, flexi-
ble program, explicitly excluding sensitive products. This results from the difficulties
which would arise in implementing a more straightforward liberalization scheme.
ASEAN requires a flexible, multi-layered approach.85 Riegel proposed, first, that a cus-
toms union be formed by four similarly developed members, namely Thailand, Malaysia,
the Philippines and Indonesia.86
This customs union will then form a free trade area with Singapore, while main-
taining the union as a unit.87 In this free trade arrangement, the scope of liberalization
will be limited to ASEAN-originated goods. Finally, there should be a special trade agree-
ment with Brunei. 88 Now, Vietnam will be perhaps treated in the same way as Brunei.
With regard to the relation with non-members, ASEAN members claim they will make
efforts to expand AFTA treatment to outsiders. It is not clear how this commitment is
related to the legal obligation of MFN treatment under the GATT, but this ambiguity may
be also common to APEC's commitment to the MFN principle. AFTA's remaining pro-
tectionist approach can be seen in its rule-of-origin requirement, though the condition
84. The restriction on this latter category should be temporary, subject to review after 8 years.
85. Hans Christopher Rieger, ASEAN. Free Trade Area or Customs Union, 132 FAR EASTERN
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has been softened. The agreement requires that a good should have ASEAN contents of
at least 40 percent to qualify for the CEPT scheme.89
Second, the safeguard measures are built into the AFTA liberalization scheme. The
agreement specifically provides that member countries are allowed to suspend provisionally
the CEPT preferences if rapidly growing imports cause serious injury to sectors producing
like or directive competitive products.9° This intra-regional safeguard is also a reflection of
the flexible approach of AFTA, and could become a model for the APEC scheme.
Third, as for harmonization at the regional level, AFTA has not yet set forth a
concrete plan. Its concern about non-tariff barriers could lead to a new attempt to har-
monize technical standards among members. However, the progress of this aspect of
trade liberalization remains to be seen.
Finally, AFTA has a notable provision concerning dispute settlement Article 7
provides that differences between member countries are to be settled amicably between
the parties concerned." The meaning of this provision is not totally dear, but ASEAN's
preference for a consensual approach - as distinguished from a legalistic approach -
can be seen. For instance, it has been proclaimed that differences in interpretation of the
CEPT will be considered by the AFTA Council, a political body, in the first instance.92 If
necessary, the matter may be referred to the ASEAN economic ministers. This approach
to dispute settlement will be another issue which should be discussed in planning APEC.
Another scheme which ASEAN has attempted is regional industrial cooperation.
ASEAN's industrial projects have experienced problems similar to other efforts at indus-
trial cooperation among developing countries in other regions. The problems may be
summarized as follows. First, as is common in any industrial policy both at the national
and regional level, governmental industrial policies always have risks of becoming harm-
ful, or at least meaningless, to private manufacturers. ASEAN's economic development
has been largely motivated by private initiatives, based upon the market mechanism.
Therefore, governmental intervention as industrial policy might negatively influence such
flexible private economic activities. Governmental plans, which are generally large scaled,
may also restrict the proper development of small and middle sized enterprises, the main
economic actors in ASEAN countries.
Second, governmental intervention tends to have an inward-looking, protection-
ist effect upon foreign multi-national enterprises, whose investments have contributed to
ASEAN's economic development.
Third, there is a tendency that regional industrial arrangements may be influ-
enced by political or social preoccupations, which would also harm private economic
activities. In the implementation of industrial plans, most decisions are political, such as
the allocation of resources and the building of plants.
ASEAN's industrial planning was influenced by these concerns, and there is a
marked trend toward projects that have intensified their private, non-interventionist, out-
ward-looking character. The first attempt was made in 1980 by the ASEAN Industrial
Projects (AIP), which tried to assign large-scale industrial projects to different member
countries. These projects have generally been considered to be a failure, since the private





al complementation scheme, was established in 1981 to be more privately motivated. It
sought to achieve cooperation among member countries in the production of particular
brands, which is called the brand to brand complementation (BBC). The BBC has the
cooperation of the ASEAN Chamber of Commerce in identifying and promoting pro-
jects. The products under this project were given preferential treatment. The latest pro-
ject is even more liberalized and flexible. The ASEAN industrial joint ventures in 1983
utilized tariff preferences as investment incentives, and joint ventures with foreign com-
panies were encouraged. to qualify, only two ASEAN participants were required, and
non-ASEAN equity was allowed up to 49 per cent 9 3 In addition, the local content of
products should be at least 51 percent.94 With this improvement in ASEAN industrial
schemes, it has become less dear whether governmental planning is really necessary.
4. Projects for Regional Trade Arrangements.
Along with general inter-governmental cooperation schemes, there has been
another stream of more functional, privately motivated attempts for regional trade
arrangements. These measures are now coming to function in the development of the
APEC process, which maintains some characteristics of early projects. Pre-APEC
schemes were all unofficial, private plans, though governmental involvement was seen
from the beginning. The development towards APEC was considered to be a process of
higher involvement of governments, as is seen in the PECC (Pacific Economic
Cooperation Council) process, a tripartite group consisting of members of business,
academia and government
a. Academic Proposals.
A possible trade arrangement in the Asia Pacific region started with a proposal for a
Pacific free trade area by a Japanese academic Kojima in 1965. This proposal was first sub-
mitted to the Japan Economic Research Centre (JERC) in his paper entitled "A Pacific
Economic Community and Asian Development Countries. 95 Its emphasis was the creation
of an effective free trade area, and therefore the membership was limited to five developed
countries, namely the U.S., Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The aim of the
PAFTA initiative consisted of the creation of a free trade area for regional liberalization. The
PAFTA also was to coordinate aid policy towards regional developing countries. Therefore,
the initiative contained a collective approach to development assistance and trade prefer-
ences for less developed countries. Kojima later proposed an organization for Pacific trade
and development (OPTAD) as a transitional body for an OPAFTA as a final goal. 96
93. The ASEAN Agreement on Industrial Joint Ventures, Nov 2, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 1233. This crite-
rion was later relaxed to 60 percent.
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The PAFTA proposal was criticized for its discriminatory nature against less
developed countries, by creating a "rich men's group" and for its passive reaction to the
common market created by the EEC. Consequently, subsequent arguments on regional
arrangements concentrated upon a loose body, OPTAD-style with wider membership,
including developing countries. However, the PAFTA proposal was based upon economic
rationality, by which the formation of a free trade area required a group of similar
economies. It presented an issue which is being revisited in the process of trade liberal-
ization in APEC: whether trade liberalization should be made among similar economies
by giving special treatment to less developed countries.
It may be premature to underestimate the value of the PAFTA proposal. Rather,
the idea can be seen as a pioneer for later arguments.
The common feature among academic proposals was a loose inter-governmental
organization, the membership of which included not only the above-mentioned five
advanced countries, but other countries, such as ASEAN members, Korea, Hong Kong,
and Pacific Island nations. The proposed organizational structure was more like that of
the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), consisting of
ministerial-level meetings, and regular sub-ministerial and steering committees.
Although discussion of an Organization for Pacific Trade and Development (OPTAD)
was a focus of attention by academics, economists, and officials, it was considered prema-
ture in comparison to the early PAFTA proposal. The main reasons for this failure are
considered to have been its perceived prematurity in Asia and the mistrust among less
developed countries, which feared domination by advanced countries.
b. Informal initiatives.
In 1968, a conference was held in Tokyo under the sponsorship of the Japanese
Foreign Ministry to discuss Kojima's 1965 PAFTA proposal. The participants were acade-
mics from five countries which were designated as possible members of PAFTA.
Subsequently, this Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) has been held
every thirteen months, providing policy-oriented discussion on issues such as the form of
a feasible regional arrangement, and inter-governmental cooperation for economic devel-
opment. Its structure consists of a simple steering committee established in 1973 and
1974. The contribution of PAFTAD is considered to be its informality, flexibility, and the
speed of personal connections among members. Although it has no direct policy-making
function, its activities have become a useful source of information for policy considera-
tion. This frequently results from governmental officials attending its conferences as
observers. With the development of other forums such as the PECC and the APEC
Eminent Persons' Group, the uniqueness of the PAFTAD has decreased. Its further con-
tribution as a purely academic, policy-oriented body remains to be seen.
The Pacific Basin Economic Council (PEBC) was established in 1967, as a body
of private business people from countries in the region.97 Its first meeting was held in
Sydney, and an annual meting has been held each May in a member country by rotation.
The structure of the Council is a network of national committees of each member, with a
97. See generally, Asian Leaders Warn of Spats Blocking Pacific Growth, ASIAN EcONOMIC NEWS,
May 30, 1994.
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steering committee for the annual meeting.98 Currently, members consist of senior busi-
ness executives from over 850 companies in 14 countries. Its main function is business
familiarization for individual contacts. Some authors have questioned its early restriction
of membership to advanced countries, as well as its utility for promoting regional cooper-
ation.99 However, as a uniquely private sector forum, the PBEC will continue to serve as
a channel between the business world and governmental policy-makers. With its
advanced, developing countries, the PBEC will have ample opporutnity to encourage eco-
nomic cooperation at the regional level.
The Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) was organized at the
Canberra seminar held in 1980, and subsequent annual meetings have been held in a
member country.100 PECC's uniqueness lies in its structure, in that it is a tripartite group
comprised of members from the private sector, academia and government. Its main
activities are policy-oriented research and discussion for regional cooperation. It focuses
upon trade cooperation, and specifically excludes military and security issues. This direc-
tion was reconfirmed in its notable Vancouver statement on Pacific economic coopera-
tion, and its subsequent statements upon the Uruguay Round of multinational trade
negotiations during the 1980s and early 1990s. 101
PECC's structure has various advantages. As an informal non-governmental
body, it can facilitate discussion among members, while government involvement ensures
a more direct influence upon official policy. PECC's unofficial character has overcome
sensitive political issues concerning its membership; its members include the "three
Chinas", Russia, and some Latin American countries, as well as the EC.
With the establishment of APEC, PECC's significance may diminish. APEC has
adopted some principles which PECC had fostered, such as a commitment to trade liberal-
ization and the principle of open regionalism, both of which preserve economic links to
non-regional countries. APEC itself has stated its respect for PECC activities in its
statement.10
2
IV. The Progress of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)."
A. THE ORIGIN OF THE APEC PROCESS.
The first inter-governmental regional arrangement in the Asia Pacific region start-
ed in November 1989, when the first ministerial meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) was held at Canberra."0 ' This initiative was first launched by
Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke during his meeting with the Korean President at
Seoul in January of that year."° These two powers took the initiative at the beginning, thus
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At the same time, doubt existed as to the behind-the-scenes maneuvering by
Japan and the U.S.' 03 Indeed, the single most serious obstacle to the Hawke initiative was
the general resistance of ASEAN members. Hawke's special envoy, Ambassador Wolcott,
visited potential Asian members to discuss their opinions of the initiative, and found that
most ASEAN countries were concerned about several issues. They feared the possible
dominance by regional powers, the weakening of the existing ASEAN cooperation, and
the absorption of the ASEAN's growing political clout As a result, most ASEAN members
(except for Malaysia and Thailand) demanded the U.S. participate in the new scheme to
diminish Japanese influence. This is true even though, in Hawke's original plan, the par-
ticipation of North American countries had not been considered.
The initiative began as a modest, low-key cooperative scheme. This original idea
has been preserved, although APEC's political influence may have been enhanced after its
first informal leaders' meeting in 1993. APEC's characteristics from its inception can be
summarized as follows. First, there is a notable flexibility in the arrangement, and infor-
mality has been preserved. This may have originated from the idea that such modest
cooperation would function better for the region without the experience of a rigid overall
regional arrangement.
Second, APEC's continuous commitment to openness is also discernible. Its
pursuit of open regionalism and commitment to the GATT/WTO rules may be seen in its
structure and operation. 104 APEC's preference for openness stems from members' preoc-
cupation with the free-trade system, export-oriented economies with the market mecha-
nism, and consequential linkage to the world market.
Third, APEC emphasizes relations with the private sector. This is due to the sig-
nificant role of the private sector in economic development APEC's programs dearly
reflect business concerns such as trade liberalization, deregulation, harmonization, invest-
ment protection, and the program envisions a private-to-government dispute settlement
mechanism. 105 This aspect is also evident in that APEC has paid attention to PECC's use
of business representatives, and its establishment of the Pacific Business Forum.
Participation of private concerns was institutionally fortified by the establishment of the
APEC Business Advisory Council at the Osaka ministerial meeting in 1995. Thus there is
a clear reluctance to promote rapid institutionalization, as well as a trend to avoid rigid,
binding rules. Instead, APEC has expressed a definite preference for informality.10 6
These characteristics basically reflect a number of institutional concerns of
ASEAN. The latter's influence is also apparent in the APEC process in general. For
instance, the ASEAN Secretariat, established in Singapore at the Bangkok ministerial
meeting in 1992, is still a modest one. This policy reflects ASEAN's opposition to rapid
institutionalization, which could restrict national policy-making. APEC's emphasis on
voluntary commitments and consistency with the WTO also reflects ASEAN's concern
about a possible exclusive trade bloc. Cooperation and developmental assistance, as well
103. Yoichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, Japan's Role in APEC, 1995, pointed, in a journalistic
way, that the Japanese Ministry of International Trade Industry was actively promoting a
regional scheme, at the same time as the Hawke initiative.




as trade liberalization and facilitation are regarded as pillars supporting ASEAN's needs.
APEC ministerial meetings and the informal leaders' meetings are alternated between an
ASEAN member and a non-ASEAN country. So far, ASEAN's influence has not been
weakened by the development of APEC. Rather, ASEAN seems to have strengthened its
voice in the APEC forum through an increasing self-confidence caused by ongoing eco-
nomic success.
B. THE BACKGROUND FOR THE APEC PRoGREss.
I. Improvement of General Atmosphere.
The 1980s can be characterized by the improvement of the region's general
strategic conditions, as a result of the Soviet Union's reform attempts and the subsequent
termination of the Cold War. However, some Cold-War-type disputes remained unre-
solved. A relative international stability may have encouraged a cooperative atmosphere.
The region had been, and still basically is, characterized by the lack of general security
framework, which has led to various bilateral or sub-regional security ties.
There are some indications that security concerns may be addressed on a more
cohesive scale in the future. For instance, Soviet President Gorbachev introduced a
regional framework with the aim of disarmament and confidence building, in his 1986
speech at Vladivostok.' 0 7 However, this initiative was shunned by Western countries as
propaganda. The ASEAN post-ministerial meeting with its dialogue partners, regularized
in 1984, might be seen as a significant attempt at a comprehensive cooperative scheme.
Moreover, in the field of economic cooperation, private initiatives like PECC enhanced
conditions for regional schemes.
APEC was established in the context of such a relatively positive atmosphere. Its
subsequent development parallels the progress of regional cooperation in different areas.
For instance, in 1994 ASEAN established the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to discuss
regional security issues.108 The ARF has some novel characteristics in the context of a
regional security framework in Asia Pacific. For instance, it is a comprehensive, inclusive
framework, like the Helsinki process, and includes the major relevant powers. Thus, it is
different from a traditional type of alliance, which presupposes a confrontation or con-
tainment against potential enemies.
The ARF is not a rigid security framework, but rather a forum and a consultative
scheme, without any dispute settlement mechanism. This aspect may reflect the general
difficulties in creating too formal a scheme. In this regard, there are similarities between
the ARF scheme and the APEC process. Similarly, the ARF is regarded as a complemen-
tary, loose framework to the existing, mainly bilateral, security networks. Thus, the ARF
expanded and reframed the existing ASEAN Post-Ministerial meetings, thus avoiding the
image of creating a completely new scheme.
107. Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev at a Ceremonial Meeting devoted to the Presentation of the
Order of Lenin to the City of Vladivostok, July 28, 1986, Far Eastern Affairs, No 1 (1987), In
this speech, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was declared.
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2. General Economic Development.
The increasing economic interdependence, coinciding with the successful devel-
opment of less developed countries, may also have contributed to the APEC process. The
progress of regional economic interdependence has naturally encouraged the general
mood for regional cooperation, principally in the economic area. In particular, an
increase in reciprocal trade has promoted cooperation among such countries, not limited
to previous cooperation dominated by a developmental concern. The success of some
former developed countries, such as the first Asian NIES and, later, ASEAN members, also
motivated a cooperative framework.
3. Political Aspects.
The creation of APEC also was motivated by political considerations. The origi-
nal Australian initiative included a willingness to solidify ties with its increasingly signifi-
cant economic partners in Asia. Japan and the Asian NIES were willing to use APEC, to
assure continued U.S. commitment to Asia as a trading partner and an anchor for region-
al security. NIES and ASEAN nations may have believed APEC could promote political
influence within and outside the region. The U.S. also hoped to use APEC for active
diplomacy toward Asia, mainly in the trade area. This policy was intensified around
1993, leading to the Seattle meetings that year.
Chinas linkage to a regional framework may be favorable for countries con-
cerned about Chinese dominance. China itself may regard APEC as a means to further
economic development by enhancing external trade. These policy considerations may
have encouraged APEC's progress. On the other hand, such political preoccupations are
potentially divisive among major sub-groups on basic issues, such as institutional form,
trade liberalization, and cooperation programs. This negative tendency intensified
recently, creating a fierce debate among APEC members.
4. A More Reactive Aspect.
Finally, there is also a more passive and reactive aspect in the creation of APEC.
The development of an advanced regional arrangement by the EC and concern over its
protectionist tendencies, contributed to the APEC initiative. Within the Asia Pacific
region another concern was the U.S. approach to regionalism, first entering into the
Canadian-American Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) and then the NAFTA. This trend
encouraged a broader framework to assure the US commitment to Asia Pacific.
The ongoing Uruguay Round trade negotiations under the GATT also had a sig-
nificant role in promoting a regional scheme. This may have been a regional alternative
in case of the failure of the Round. APEC also was utilized to pressure the EC to work
toward successful conclusion of the Round. The Uruguay Round was, indeed, an implicit
actor for the development of APEC at an early stage. APEC's four consecutive declara-
tions upon the Round from 1990 to 1994 are considered to be an early achievement by
APEC. 109 In particular, the final 1994 declaration, along with the first leaders' meeting
109. See generally, Christopher B. Johnstone, APEC Trade Ministerial Focuses on WTO Agenda,
JAPAN EcONOMIC INSnTUTE OF AMEPICA, July 26, 1996.
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the same year, pressured the EC to conclude the Round.
C. THE APEC PROCESS. 110
1. The First Canberra Ministerial Meeting (1989).111
The inaugural ministerial meeting was held at Canberra in 1989, and included
the U.S., Canada, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and ASEAN members. The main
achievement of the meting is its occurrence. The Joint Statement issued after the meeting
was full of negative checkpoints, items to be avoided in the APEC process. These points
included the avoidance of a trade bloc by ensuring compliance with the GATT rules. The
ministers also avoided a decision upon a particular structure, since any such determina-
tion was premature. APEC was regarded as a modest consultative forum for exchange of
views and research, not a rigid institution.11 2
APEC maintained and extended some existing basic principles, including the
recognition of the economic and cultural diversity, and the possible implementation of
work programs. 113 The statement mentioned programs on economic studies, trade liber-
alization, investment, technology transfer and human resource development, reviews of
data on regional trade flows and development, and the facilitation of trade, investment
and technical transfer opportunities. These plans were further elaborated by subsequent
senior officials' meetings. The statement also expressed a desire to strengthen relations
with the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.
2. The Second Ministerial Meeting at Singapore (1990). '14
APEC began to take shape more fully at the second meeting at Singapore. The
Joint Statement suggested that regional cooperation for development, along with trade
liberalization, were the main elements of APEC. The statement dearly expressed a desire
to promote regional liberalization "so long as any such liberalization [was] consistent
with GATT principles and [was] not to the detriment of other parties" 11 5 Thus, the par-
ties stipulated GATT's prohibition against protectionist policy. The APEC Declaration on
the Uruguay Round was made on the same occasion, and promoted the successful con-
clusion of the Round.
110. Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC): Declaration of Common Resolve, Nov.
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This was APEC's first external policy declaration, and it demonstrated its shared
interest. Ministers also agreed to a framework for work projects, which included (1)
review of trade and investment data; (2) trade promotion and programs and mechanisms
for cooperation; (3) expansion of investment and technical transfer; (4) a multilateral
human resource development initiative; (5) regional energy cooperation; (6) marine
resource conservation and marine pollution; and (7) telecommunications. 116
3. The Third Ministerial Meeting at Seoul (1991). 117
The meeting at Seoul was significant for the subsequent development of both
activities and structure. Ministers clarified APEC's objectives and procedures by their
Joint Statement and APEC Declaration. In the Joint Statement, "Ministers endowed
APEC with a dear international personality."118 The legal meaning of this "international
personality" was not initially dear, but at least APEC was becoming recognized as an
independent entity at the international level. 119 This was evident in the fact that in the
following year APEC concluded an agreement on privileges and immunities with
Singapore in creating its secretariat.
In addition, the statement again reconfirmed APEC's commitment to GATT
rules, pointing out that APEC would pursue "trade liberalization within APEC on a
GATT-consistent basis and not to the detriment of others."120 The statement also set
forth and authorized a list of work programs, consisting of ten schemes, which included
the seven tasks mentioned in § III.C.2, supra, and added three others: fisheries, trans-
portation, and tourism. Finally, the statement agreed that APEC members considered
"the possibility of establishing a mechanism of a permanent basis so [as to] provide sup-
port and coordination for APEC activities at various levels. 12 1 This led to the establish-
ment of the secretariat in the following year.
The APEC Seoul Dedaration may be the most significant document so far in the
process in general. It dearly stipulated the objectives of APEC, which are (1) economic
development of the region; (2) the enhancement of positive gains from economic inter-
dependence by general liberalization; (3) the strengthening of an open, multilateral trad-
ing system; and (4) the reduction of barriers to trade and services, "in a manner consis-
tent with Gatt principles, where applicable, and without detriment to other
economies."122
With regard to the mode of operation, the Declaration stipulated both (1) the
principle of mutual benefit, taking into account the region's diversity, and (2) open dia-
logue and consensus building among members. The Seoul Declaration also set forth the
principles for participation, including the requirements that (1) new participants should
have strong economic links; (2) they should accept the procedures, objectives and princi-
116. Id.







pies of APEC; and (32) decisions will be made on the basis of a consensus of all participants.
APEC's structure was streamlined by stipulating the capacity of annual and
additional ministerial meetings to determine the nature of activities and their implemen-
tation.1 23 The structure also would include a "senior officials' meeting," responsible for
developing the APEC process in accordance with the decisions of the ministerial meet-
ings. 124 Finally, the Declaration proposed a "work programme" to be pursued by a work-
ing group.125 Perhaps most notably, the three Chinas participated for the first time at the
Seoul meeting.
4. The Fourth Ministerial Meeting at Bangkok (1992)126.
The fourth meeting basically followed the agenda of the previous meeting, while
adding some important institutional developments. It established the secretariat in
Singapore. In the Bangkok Declaration on APEC Institutional Arrangements, Ministers
also endowed a legal entity to the secretariat, to "enjoy such legal capacity as is necessary
for the exercise of its functions " 127 It was also agreed that APEC had budgetary arrange-
ments "to cover administrative and operation costs." 128 This budget is quite modest,
reflecting an opposition to any strong institutional arrangement.
Ministers also agreed to establish a small eminent persons' group, made up of
private academics, as an advisory body.
In the Bangkok Statement, ministers mentioned sub-regional arrangements,
such as NAFTA and AFTA, and said that "APEC should encourage investment linkages,
regional and sub-regional trade arrangements to be outward-looking and GATT-consis-
tent." 129 This statement reflects some concern about the development of sub-regional
arrangements. On the membership issue, the view was expressed that "APEC was enter-
ing a phase when consolidation and effectiveness should be the primary considerations,
and the decisions on further participation require careful consideration in regard to the
mutual benefits to both APEC and prospective participants."130
Thus, as is common in regional arrangements, APEC began to balance its expan-
sion on one hand, against the its potential effectiveness on the other. With this policy, it
appears that APEC has become less enthusiastic about increasing its membership, choos-
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5. The Fifth Ministerial Meeting and the First Leaders' Meeting at
Seattle (1993).131
The Seattle meeting basically reconfirmed APEC's objectives, in particular its
commitment to regional trade liberalization. Instead of progressing toward a new era of
APEC, the Seattle Declaration envisioned "a community of Asia Pacific economies." 132
However, some important arrangements were made by leaders. First, APEC
decided that a Finance Ministers' meeting would be held subsequently. This was a depar-
ture from the previous attitude towards financial matters, since national financial author-
ities, particularly the U.S. and Japan, proposed that economic policy coordination be
made within existing frameworks, such as the G-7 process and the OECD.
Second, the Pacific Business Forum (PBF) was established as an advisory forum,
to be "comprised of two private sector representatives, including one representing small
and medium business, from each member."133 The PBF submitted their report for review
at subsequent meetings. Third, APEC leaders adopted a non-binding code of principles
covering investment issues. This was achieved in the following year.
Ministers also reconfirmed APEC's basic principles. In both the Joint Statement
and the Declaration on an APEC Trade and Investment framework, they stipulated GATT
consistency, consensus-building, flexibility and diversity, as before. Some institutional
changes were made. First, the Committee on Trade and Investment (CTI) replaced the
previous informal group on regional trade liberalization. This change was to allow APEC
to pursue fully the reduction of barriers to trade in goods and services and investment
among participants in a manner consistent with GATT principles and without detriment
to other economies. 134
Second, the Group on Economic Trends and Issues (ETI) was established "to
propose a direction that will engage a productive dialogue that will examine possible area
of economic cooperation without extending into the realm of economic policy coordina-
tion."135 On the membership issue, ministers "agreed to defer consideration of additional
members for three years," 136 in an effort to preserve APEC's effectiveness. Nonetheless,
Mexico and Papua New Guinea were admitted, and it was agreed that Chile would join at
the 1994 meeting. As with each previous year, the organization reaffirmed its Declaration
on the Uruguay Round. This step is considered to have put pressure to the EC, leading to
the conclusion of the Round later that year.
131. APEC: Seattle Declaration, Nov. 15, 1993 (onfile with APEC secretariat).
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6. Sixth Ministerial Meeting at Jakarta and the Second Leaders'
Meeting at Bogor (1994).137
The 1994 meetings showed some important progress in cooperation, although
they maintained APEC's principles of GATT consistency and the consideration of intra-
regional diversity. In the APEC Leaders' Declaration of Common Resolve, leaders agreed
to the goals of regional liberalization with specific deadlines. Free and open trade and
investment in APEC is to be achieved no later than 2020, with the industrialized
economies to lead the way no later than 2010. This commitment was broadly regarded as
a political declaration, rather than a binding legal agreement, since until now, each mem-
ber has maintained the principle of a voluntary liberalization.
Specific details of this liberalization program were not clarified; therefore its
operations have yet to be observed. If the final goal of the program is the creation of a
free trade arrangement, the 2010 or 2020 deadline may create a problem, in view of the
WTO rule which contemplates a transition period of 10 years.
I believe that APEC should prove that a longer period of transition is necessary
than that set forth in WTO rules. If the program espouses partial liberalization, all liber-
alization should be extended to non-members on a MFN basis, under the WTO rule. In
this regard, leaders stated that "the actual reduction of barriers among APEC economies
but also between APEC economies and non-APEC economies " 138 but added that non-
APEC developing countries would "benefit from the trade and investment liberalization
in conformity with GATT-WTO provision" 139 This latter sentence is unclear, but the
rule is that partial liberalization at the regional level should be extended to all outsiders,
regardless of their level of development This statement requires clarification by APEC.
The declaration also provided special treatment for developing members, by say-
ing that "those that are not yet ready to participate may join at a later date." 140 It is not
clear which prospective members deserve such treatment. Leaders also agreed to examine
the feasibility of "a voluntary consultative dispute mediation service:' to supplement the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism; however, no details have been clarified. 141
Another achievement was the adoption of the APEC Non-Binding Investment
Principles, which stipulated some basic principles for regional investment, based upon
liberalization and fairness. In this document, the ministers affirm that non-APEC
investors should be treated equally with APEC investors, and eventually with indigenous
investors, under the principles of non-discrimination and national treatment.
In the Minister's Joint Statement, the following institutional changes were
agreed. First, the Ad Hoc Group on Economic Trends and Issues, developed for economic
review and analysis, was transformed into the Economic Committee. There seems to be a
ladder for promotion of groups, in that a working group may be raized to an ad hoc
137. Common Resolve, supra note 110.
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group, and finally to a committee, as in this case.
In addition, the Budget and Administrative Committee (BAC) was established.
This committee was given charge of budgetary issues and the improvement of opera-
tional and administrative efficiency. Finally, under the Committee on Trade and
Investment, the ministers established the Subcommittee on Standards and Conformance
and the Subcommittee on Customs Procedures.
7. Seventh Ministerial Meeting and the Third Leaders' Meeting at
Osaka (1995). 142
Meetings at Osaka showed the initial stages of implementation of the Bogor
Declaration's liberalization program. Reconfirmed principles included the principle of
voluntary liberalization with collective actions in other areas. The Osaka meeting also
ensured that APEC remains consistent with WTO agreements. The desirability of an
APEC dispute resolution mechanism was also agreed upon, but details were not dis-
cussed. Leaders set January 1997 as the date for beginning overall implementation of the
action plans for liberalization and facilitation. In order to achieve this, they set forth a
general implementation plan in the Action Agenda, and demonstrated their commitment
by offering preparatory liberalization and facilitation in the Initial Actions.
The Action Agenda again reconfirms the existing principles of WTO consistency,
non-discrimination, and flexibility: "the outcome of trade and investment liberalization
will be the actual reduction of barriers not only among APEC economies but also
between APEC economies and non-APEC economies' 143 As to flexibility, the statement
pointed out that "considering the different levels of economic development among the
APEC economies and the diverse circumstances in each economy, flexibility will be avail-
able in dealing with issues arising from such circumstances in the liberalization and facili-
tation process.""144
The Action Agenda sets forth the liberalization and facilitation arrangements for
each sector, while giving additional attention to sub-regional arrangements. In this
regard, the members considered "extending on a voluntary basis, to all APEC economies,
the benefits of reductions and eliminations of tariff and non-tariff measures, derived
from sub-regional arrangements."1 45 With respect to trade in services, particular
attempts for a general harmonization or mutual recognition of standards and procedures
become evident. This is seen particularly in the sectors of telecommunications, trans-
portation, energy and customs procedures. The necessity for harmonization in the areas
of competition policy, intellectual property rights, as well as rules of origin, are also
demonstrated. Concerning a possible regional dispute settlement, APEC set forth an
intention to create dispute settlement mechanisms, including disputes between govern-
ments and private entities. 146 This may reflect a request from the business sector, as
shown in the Pacific Business Forum report
142. APEC: Osaka Action Agenda on Implementation of the Bogor Declaration, Nov. 19, 1995, 35
I.L.M. I1111.
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The Joint Statement also stated that the cooperative aspect should be treated as a
main pillar of APEC activities by noting that Ministers stressed the need to further pro-
mote economic and technical cooperation to achieve sustainable growth and equitable
development in the Asia Pacific region. 14 7
On the institutional side, Ministers agreed to strengthen the secretariat, though
specific planning was delegated to the Senior Officials' meetings. With regard to the par-
ticipation issue, they also instructed the Senior Officers to consider APEC's policy on new
membership and observer states. Finally, another new organization, the APEC Business
Advisory Council (ABAC), was established, corresponding to the request by the Pacific
Business Forum. This may strengthen the formal influence of business concerns upon
the APEC process, but, on the other hand, this change may effect the previous methods of
neutral, independent and, perhaps, more efficient business involvement.
D. SOME MAIN ISSUES IN THE APEC PROCESS.
The following part summarizes the main issues in the development of APEC
process, based upon the above-mentioned observation of APEC's history.
1. The Scope of APEC.
Like other regional arrangements, APEC has reached the stage where it must bal-
ance effectiveness with size. The 1991 Seoul APEC Declaration set out the general criteria
for new members. 148 However, the Declaration showed that new participants would be
eventually admitted by consensus among existing members.
In order to achieve effective cooperation, APEC's arrangements will require a cer-
tain level of equal economic performance, as well as a certain level of development by each
member. This aspect is particularly important for APEC, which, from the beginning, has
had a diverse membership. On the other hand, regional stability and conflict prevention
may require broad inclusion, just as the ASEAN Regional Forum in the security area has the
principle of a comprehensive membership. Whether the expansion of sub-regional
arrangements should be considered in the expansion of APEC itself is also an issue.
Mexico's admission was probably encouraged by the formation of NAFTA.
Moreover, Chilean accession to NAFTA further encouraged its inclusion in APEC. A
related issue is whether, with the development of NAFTA and a possible Western
Hemisphere Free Trade Agreement, new members of an inter-American arrangement
should automatically be admitted to APEC. The same issue is becoming apparent in
147. Id.
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ASEAN meetings. As early as 1992, in the keynote speech of the Bangkok ministerial
meeting, the Thai Prime Minster emphasized that "APEC, as a uniquely diverse and open
consultative forum, holds vast untapped potential for cooperation in a broad range of
areas, economic and otherwise,"149 implying a wider political arena. Particularly with the
informality which APEC maintains, a substantial expansion of its coverage is likely.
2. The Structure of APEC.
There is an agreement among APEC members that APEC should not seek a rigid
institutional structure, in order to maintain its flexibility and voluntarism as princi-
ples.150 Its institutional structure thus maintains a simple form, consisting of ministerial
meetings as the formal supervisory body, senior officials' meetings, and a limited number
of committees and working groups. Its secretary and budgetary arrangements are both
quite limited to avoid a large bureaucracy.
On the other hand, with extensive development of APEC programs, the current
loose structure might be insufficient. Indeed, APEC has shown a steady institutional
development, with the establishment of permanent committees, establishment and
expansion of the secretariat and budgetary arrangements, and the creation of an annual
informal leaders' meeting. The issue of institutional expansion should be examined in
light of the progress of APEC programs, including trade liberalization and various facili-
tation measures.
In considering this issue, we should bear in mind that the effectiveness of insti-
tutions is difficult to evaluate. Since its inception, a relatively soft, flexible, informal
structure has been considered suitable for Asia Pacific cooperation. This is because such
flexibility is expected to create efficient management. In this regard, the OECD-type soft
organization was considered most suitable, as opposed to the EC type of rigid framework.
Stereotypical images of these two types are summarized in Table 1. It is true that the
OECD has been relatively successful in coordinating members' policy, even though it has
no binding legal instruments for implementation. Rather, "peer" pressure and mutual
verification are frequently pointed out to explain this efficiency.
However, this de facto mechanism is possible because the OECD is a group of
countries, all of which have an advanced economy. This leads to a more equal footing
and like-mindedness of members. This condition normally is difficult to achieve; APEC
members, in particular, are far from "equal footing." Therefore, to provide a reliable, pre-
dictable and stable business environment, some situations may require a relatively rigid
mechanism.
149. APEC: Bankok Ministerial Meeting, Sept. 10, 1992, (on file with APEC Secretariat).
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Table 1 Stereotypical images of the two types of organizations
The EC-type The OECD-type




internal arrangements centralized less centralized
binding rules voluntary rules
judicial settlement peer pressures
majority rule unanimity rule
external relations closed open
protectionism liberalized
3. The Process of APEC Arrangements.
One of APEC's objectives has been liberalization at the regional level, while
maintaining consistency with the GATT-WTO rules. So far, the regional liberalization
program has not been fully implemented. Therefore, the issue is whether APEC can
effectively balance regional liberalization with WTO consistency. Under the WTO rule,
APEC has two choices. It may create a free trade area incompatible with the WTO rules,
or it may extend to non-APEC countries under the MFN principle. The 1994 Bogor
Declaration has set forth the final goal of regional liberalization by 2020. It is unclear
whether the aim is a free trade arrangement or partial liberalization with NFN extension
to non-members.
Realistically speaking, it will be difficult to achieve complete intra-regional liber-
alization considering the members' economic diversity. It is also unrealistic to expect that
all APEC members will extend intra-regional liberalization to non-members for domesti-
cally sensitive sectors. The 2020 transition deadline is far beyond the WTO's 10 year
limit. APEC may use voluntary liberalization as an excuse in this regard by saying that
any liberaliaation is on an individual basis, and that it therefore is not imposed by APEC.
Thus, it is up to individual members whether regional liberalization should be extended
to non-members. If APEC members act against the WTO rule, it is the members, not
APEC, that should be blamed. This approach may be difficult to sustain, and eventually,
APEC will be required under WTO to explain the legal basis for its programs.
Relating to liberalization/compatability is the issue of sub-regional arrange-
ments, such as NAFTA and AFTA. In addition, overlapping regional arrangements with
APEC reflect an ongoing scheme of a free trade area for the Americas. Under the WTO
rule, there is no distinction between a relatively comprehensive regional arrangement and
sub-regional ones. Therefore, any sub-regional and overlapping arrangements shall
themselves satisfy the conditions stipulated in the General Agreement.
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On the other hand, the relation between an umbrella arrangement, like APEC,
and sub-arrangements, like NAFTA and AFTA, may be difficult to coordinate, in part
because of their differing levels of liberalization. For instance, NAFTA has achieved a
more advanced level of liberalization than APEC, while AFTA may be a more limited. In
combination with a more rigid rule of origins, this may cause discrimination among
members in an umbrella arrangement Another view is that an increase in free trade
arrangements, whether sub-regional or overlapping, would lead to eventual free trade at
the global level. 15 1 But, in reality, the result may be increased discrimination. This issue
should continuously be reevaluated.
A more political issue is the possible creation of an exdusive East Asian arrange-
ment as a unit within APEC. The Malaysian initiative of an East Asian Economic Caucus
(EAEC, originally named an East Asian Economic Group) has been widely debated in this
context. 152 This initiative is meant to counteract against the NAFTA; however, it may have
a protectionist effect upon other APEC members. The specific scheme of an EAEC has not
been made dear. It is at least a forum for discussion among geographically dose economies
in East Asia. There is a view that the EAEC initiative itself has placed pressure on the APEC
process, thus increasing the strong commitment toward regional liberalization.
As economic transactions intensify, it is natural that both tarriff and non-tariff
measures (induding administrative procedures and regulations) have become a focus of
attention. In APEC, too, the treatment of non-tariff measures in major industrial sectors
has been on the agenda. The solution to non-tariff measures may be their reduction or
abolition.
However, if these measures are necessary from a policy standpoint, one viable
solution is aligning these barriers with international standards. Although this would be
possible among countries with similar levels of development, APEC members' diversity
may prevent the utilization of such standards. Therefore, current APEC programs favor
a mutual recognition of other members' trade standards and policies as an alternative
solution. This can be seen in the Action Agenda for trade liberalization and facilitation,
adopted in the 1995 Osaka meeting. However, it is difficult to imagine that mutual recog-
nition will be implemented due to diverse administrative procedures, economic struc-
tures, and stages of development. Thus, standards of advanced and developing countries
may be incompatible. Moreover, the reverse situation, in which developing members
have stricter standards, also may occur.
As mentioned in recent joint statements, APEC is considering the creation of a
dispute settlement mechanism at the regional level, which would supplement the WTO
dispute settlement mechanism. 153 The Jakarta Statement, for instance, suggested that a
regional settlement mechanism will be a mediatory body, rather than a WTO-style settle-
ment forum.
151. C. Fred Bergsten, APEC and World Trade; A Force for Worldwide Liberalization, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, May/June 1994, at 20.
152. Linda Low, The EastAsian Economic Grouping, Vol. 4, No. 4, THE PACIFc REviEw (1991); Nigel
Holloway and Thony Rowley, East Asian Trade Grouping at Top of Region's Agenda, An
Insurance Policy, FAR EAsTRENu ECONOMIC REVIEW, July 25, 1991, at 52; Malaysians Question
APEC Goal, FINANCIAL TIMES Nov. 9, 1994.
153. APEC: OSAKA Action Agenda on Implementation of the Bogor Declaration, supra note 142.
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These ideas may be based upon concern over recent trans-Pacific economic dis-
putes, mainly between the U.S. and Asian economies. Thus, it may be argued that a more
efficient settlement mechanism is required. However, if a regional settlement mechanism
is established, it will be necessary to show why a separate regional mechanism can be
more effective than the WTO process. APEC may argue that disputes in the Asia-Pacific
region are distinct or that members would more willingly accept regional solutions. Table
2 describes legal and extralegal settlement mechanisms.
In all likelihood the WTO system would be more effective at resolbing disputes.
However, given the economic and political diversity of APEC members, it is doubtful
whether an Asian-style dispute resolution system will be effective. Moreover, the business
sector may favor litigation, since judicial opinions promote predictability as to the legality
of business activities. This issue must be further researched.
Table 2: Ideal types of legal and extra-legal dispute settlement mechanisms.
The legal mechanisms Extra-legal mechanisms
Substantive aspect Based upon law, with Law deemphasized in
prescribed rules. favor of ad hoc
coordination.
Procedural aspect Rigid procedural rules. Rules of Procedure
Objective decisions. deemphasized.
Adversarial proceedings. Subjective decisions.
Binding judgments, with Judgment may not be
decisive effect. binding on subsequent
parties.
General characteristics Simple application of More general approach,
law. considering various
Based on purely judicial factors.
considerations. Policy considerations
Legalistic fairness. may be included.
Overall fairness.
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E. FUruRE PROSPECTS FOR THE APEC PROCESS.
The arguments will continue as to APEC's future, especially as to whether APEC
should maintain its "soft" and open structure or whether it should introduce a more rigid
and dosed style. APEC is likely to preserve its basic principles, such as its flexible, mini-
malist institutional arrangement, its voluntary approach to liberalization, and its non-dis-
criminatory consistency with WTO. However, at the same time, elements substantially
contrary to these principles will be introduced. For example, we already have seen grad-
ual institutionalization in a more rigid form, such as the regularization of informal lead-
ers' meetings, an increase in the number and responsibilities of committees, and an incre-
mental expansion of the secretariat and of budgetary arrangements.
The restrictive attitude towards admission of new members, based in part upon
the concern for APEC's effectiveness, may result from attitudes toward flexibility and sim-
ilarity of purpose. On the other hand, APEC may expand the scope of its activities as a
result of accumulated routine practice. The leaders' meetings are becoming a more com-
prehensive discussion body, covering both economic and non-economic matters, while
retaining their informal position in APEC.
A newly established dispute settlement mechanism may increase its jurisdiction
over non-economic matters under the guise of vague details regarding APEC competence.
There is certainly a demand for a forum with broad coverage, including social matters,
security aspects and human rights issues, though, at present, these areas are removed
from the APEC process. This is made possible by APEC's enhancement of a cooperative
mood through its frequent consultations and cooperative activities. Institutionally, the
development of APEC's action-oriented programs will increase the need for a reliable
institutional arrangement. This goal will be achieved through a deliberate expansion of
APEC institutions. Therefore, APEC will become another example of an evolutionary
formation of regional arrangements.
V. Conclusion.
In the Asia Pacific region, the establishment of a regional arrangement is not
necessarily a prerequisite for its further economic development. Such an arrangement
will have limited significance from an economic viewpoint, save for the enhancement of
predictability or certainty and the provision of a forum for consultations. The Asia
Pacific economic arrangement is motivated by more political considerations, including
the reaction against other regions' initiatives for regional arrangements, and the avoid-
ance of separate integration in both the Western and Eastern Pacific.
Against this background, an Asia Pacific regional arrangement will over towards
pragmatic cooperation, while maintaining openness to outsiders. This reflects the charac-
teristics of the region as a whole, which is economically, politically and culturally diverse.
The issues which the APEC process is expected to address in the future include
its membership and the scope of an arrangement, its organizational structure, and its pol-
icy goals. These goals include internal liberalization, harmonization and the establish-
ment of a workable dispute settlement (or consultation) mechanism.
As to APEC's implications for the NAFTA, and aside from the competitive
aspects addressed above, several factors should be pointed out. First, while much less
geographically remote than Asia Pacific nations, the NAFTA Parties are quite culturally
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and politically diverse. Their economic systems are widely varied, with Mexico seeing
unprecedented development due in part to the NAFTA itself. Each nation's ethnic back-
ground is quite divergent, with strong influence from English and French systems in the
north, and a Latin culture in the south. Moreover, each nation has a distinct domestic
policy, set forth by governments with diverse interests.
Additionally, several Central and South American nations are considering join-
ing the NAFTA, and the entire region considers a Western Hemisphere Free Trade
Agreement a real possibility. While many of these nations would bring substantial benefit
to the accord, this growth can be compared to the difficulties faced by Asian and Pacific
Rim nations during the growth of the Asia Pacific cooperatives. Therefore, the NAFTA
should bear in mind the following lessons.
First, and perhaps most important, member nations must recognize the cultural,
political and economic diversity among members and prospective members. This char-
acteristic will involve all aspects of the treaty, its institutions and implementation.
In addition, the NAFTA is structurally flexible. This arrangement has definite.
advantages in early stages, in that it allows for ad hoc decision making and places reason-
able limits on growth. However, APEC has demonstrated amply that this format - per-
haps inevitably - will require greater structure as the need increases for binding arrange-
ments and stronger dispute resolution mechanisms.
Finally, the NAFTA must ensure that its arrangements do not conflict with
GATT-WTO requirements. It should not discriminate between internal and external
trade, and should not allow regional concerns to dominate its free trade basis.

